
PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

and

CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY

Disarmament – Unilateral and Bilateral Actions

BY

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A BRIEFING SEMINAR ON THE
PREPARATIONS FOR THE PREPARATIONS – THE 2002 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE NPT REVIEW
CONFERENCE OF 2005

L'IMPÉRIAL PALACE HOTEL

ANNECY, FRANCE

8 – 9 MARCH 2002

(PRESENTATION 4)

Disarmament – Unilateral and Bilateral Actions

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**Prepared for PPNN
NPT Preparatory Process “Briefing Seminar”
March 8-9, 2002**

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Overview

- **Some context**
- **Some of the year 2000 “13 Steps”**
- **Some closing thoughts**

NPT & Disarmament

- **Pursuit of nuclear disarmament a central element of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**
 - Under Article VI
 - In eyes of virtually all parties
 - As one source of NPT's legitimacy and authority
- **Final Declaration of 2000 included comprehensive set of disarmament commitments**
 - So-called "13 Steps"

Some concerns in today's political-strategic situation

- **But concerns about some recent U.S. actions**
 - **Shelving CTBT**
 - **Shelving START II treaty-based approach**
 - **Withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty (ABM)**
 - **Uneasiness about missile defenses plans**
- **Plus some concerns about Russian nuclear doctrine and China nuclear modernization**
- **Risk of nuclear war in South Asia a wild card**
 - **And of terrorist access to nuclear materials**

Some opportunities in today's political-strategic situation

- **But other elements more promising today**
 - **Bush Administration commitment to non-adversarial relationship**
 - **Presidents Bush-Putin pursuit of “New Framework”**
 - » **With upcoming Summit to force events**
 - **More “businesslike” U.S.-China dialogue**
 - **Sense of post 9-11 “fork in the road”**
- **For virtually all of “13 Steps”, too soon to tell what 2005 will bring in terms of implementing actions**

“13 Steps” of 2000 Final Declaration

- **Agreement on “13 Steps” critical to 2000 NPT RevCon success**
 - **Comprehensive agenda for action**
 - **Basis for dialogue on nuclear disarmament progress in “Strengthened Review Process”**
- **Following charts review those steps related to unilateral and bilateral disarmament**
 - **What**
 - **Interpretations**
 - **Today’s Status**
- **Will not focus on recommended actions – many conceivable, see PPNN study**

Step # 5: “Irreversibility”

- **“The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament”**
- **Interpretations: disarmament measures should be difficult and costly to reverse**
 - **Reflects belief that stability will be enhanced**
- **Status today:**
 - **Some questions in U.S. about the principle**
 - » **But the practice awaits outcome of U.S.-Russian negotiations on New Strategic Framework**
 - **And follow-up implementation discussions**

Step # 6: An Unequivocal Undertaking

- **“An unequivocal undertaking by the [NWS] to . . . the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which . . . committed under Article VI”**
- **Interpretations: reaffirmation of principle of Article VI or a new commitment?**
 - **Key to NPT 2000 success**
- **Today’s status:**
 - **Negotiations on significant nuclear restructuring – plus to pursue non-adversarial relationship**
 - **But new thinking on roles of nuclear weapons in some quarters in Russia, in U.S.**

Step # 7 (a): *START* and ABM Treaty

- “The early entry into force of *START II* and the conclusion of *START III*”
- Interpretations: traditional “treaty-based” nuclear reductions are path to take
- Status today:
 - U.S. belief treaty-based process dead in water
 - U.S.-Russia seeking other way to codify *major and dramatic nuclear reductions*
 - » Outcome in terms of degree of irreversibility, transparency, predictability being negotiated
 - » Concerns about U.S. decision not to eliminate all reduced warheads – though no capability to do so in near term anyway

Step # 7 (a): START and *ABM Treaty*

- “. . . strengthening the [ABM] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability”
- Interpretations: NPT RevCon endorsement
- Status today:
 - Bush Administration notice of intention to withdraw
 - » Reflects belief treaty constrains limited defenses & is relic of Cold War adversarial thinking
 - Negotiations/discussions underway with Moscow and Beijing on missile defenses
 - » How far will U.S. be prepared to go to reassure each?

Step # 9a: Unilateral Reductions

- **“Further efforts by the NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.”**
- **Interpretations: support for unilateral approach, though some practical questions**
 - **Warheads? Delivery systems? Of what sort?**
- **Status today:**
 - **Bush Administration commitment to unilateral cuts**
 - » **Questions about warheads to be kept as “responsive capability” rather than eliminated**
 - **Russian more skeptical about unilateral actions**
 - » **Though some skepticism of Russian follow-through on 1991 commitments – or possible reversals**
 - **Negotiations underway – “unilateral plus” likely**

Step # 9b: Transparency

- **“Increased transparency by the [NWS]. . . .”**
- **Interpretations: greater openness good; about what left unspecified**
- **Today’s status:**
 - **Different degrees of acceptance of principle among NWS**
 - **In practice, process now underway**
 - **Plus transparency likely to be one element of New Strategic Framework of U.S. –Russia**
 - » **But how far? Over what? With what else?**
 - **China seeking U.S. transparency on missile defenses – any reciprocity on nuclear posture?**
 - **Increasingly critical element of future strategic stability via mutual reassurance**

Step # 9c: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

- **“Further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as disarmament process.”**
- **Interpretations: both informal and formal actions sought**
 - **Different views on what weapons covered**
- **Today status:**
 - **Not on U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions agenda – nor interest in putting it there but**
 - **U.S.-Russian cooperation on enhanced security of nuclear weapons storage**

Step # 9d: Operational Status

- **“Concrete and agreed measures to reduce the operational status”**
- **Interpretations: NWS to move back from Cold War operational nuclear postures**
 - **Work it out for themselves, consistent with stability**
- **Today’s status:**
 - **Significant reductions of forces on alert have occurred – though “dealerting” principle resisted**
 - **U.S.-Russia cooperation on Warning**
 - **More non-adversarial relationship of U.S.-Russia would pave way for further actions**

Step # 9e: A Diminishing Role for Nuclear Weapons

- **“A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies”**
- **Interpretations: reduced defense significance**
 - But more or less expansive views on what meant
- **Today’s status:**
 - **New Strategic Framework & non-adversarial relationship should result in diminished role for U.S.-Russia**
 - » Qualified by Russian “usable nuclear” doctrine, U.S. concerns about bio threat
 - » Could see greater role in U.S.-China relationship – unless handle missile defenses, Taiwan issues

Some others of the “13 Steps”

- **Step # 9f: Engagement of “All States” in Total Elimination Process**
- **Step # 10: Surplus Material to International Monitoring**
- **Step # 11: Ultimate Objective of General and Complete Disarmament**
- **Step # 12: Reporting by all States on Article VI Implementation**
- **Step # 13: Development of Verification Capabilities**

Some closing thoughts

- **“13 Steps” sets out comprehensive agenda**
- **In pursuing that agenda, however, it is important to remember**
 - **The NPT matters for countries’ security**
 - **Progress toward nuclear disarmament matters for the NPT’s health – and for a safer world**
 - ***There is not only one pathway for pursuing the NPT’s nuclear disarmament goals***
 - » **Instead, there are many strategies, many actions, many different approaches**
 - **Plus – it is still a long way to 2005 – but let the dialogue begin**