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**PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION**

**and**

**CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY**

**The Evolving Political and Strategic Context after**

**11 September and Commitments in the 2000 Final Document**

**(revised version)**

BY

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A BRIEFING SEMINAR ON THE


PREPARATIONS FOR THE PREPARATIONS – THE 2002 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE NPT  
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF 2005

L'IMPÉRIAL PALACE HOTEL, ANNECY, FRANCE

8 – 9 MARCH 2002

(PRESENTATION 1)

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## Harald Mueller, PRIF

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**The strategic situation after Sept. 11:  
Implications for the nuclear agenda**  
PPNN/MCIS meeting, Annecy, March 8./9

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## Contents of the presentation

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- What's new strategically?
  - Nuclear arms control & nonproliferation before Sept. 11
  - The agenda today:
    - Facilitating, and strengthening the anti-terror coalition
    - Reducing possibilities of access to fissile material
    - Preparing for nuclear emergency response



## Sept. 11 has identified a new common threat and created the conditions for a coalition across previous conflict lines

- Transnational mega-terrorism is a serious threat to a large number of states
- This includes all major powers
- As a clear and present challenge to security, this threat overshadows many other conflicts that have influenced interstate relations previously
- This situation creates a possibility for a concert of the major powers and a broad alliance for the fight against transnational terrorism
- The role of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation must be seen in this new strategic context



Sept. 11 has changed priorities from a.c. as instrument of interstate stability  
to a.c. as auxiliary means of combating terrorism

### Before

- Stability
- Confidence building
- Cost reduction
- Conflict transformation
- Interstate Nonproliferation

### After

- Support for coalition building -  
elimination of stumbling blocks
- Nonproliferation to non-state  
actors
- Positive security assurances  
/emergency assistance



## Coalition building requires a review of present defence and security priorities

- Remove stumbling blocks
  - Deal with NMD problem cooperatively
  - Agree to deep cuts; reconsider needs for flexibility
  - Strengthen existing WMD regimes
- Enhance confidence for conflict transformation
  - Work on security dilemma by measures addressing alert status
  - Establish acceptable levels of transparency
- Adjust nonproliferation priorities
  - Address de-facto nuclear weapon states issue
  - Approach coalition-capable „states of concern“



## Coalition building requires mitigating cleavages in the nonproliferation regime

- Implement steps in 2000 NPT Review Final Declaration
- Avoid backtracking on „unequivocal commitment“; don't put flexibility above irreversibility
- Deal carefully with NSA issue
- Address regional issues, notably Middle East, adequately
- Find ways to deal with noncompliance issues through multilateral channels



## Reducing access by non-state actors to fissile material requires accelerating and strengthening existing measures

- Implement START II, accelerate follow-up talks, possibly preceded by mutual unilateral steps, reduce nonstrategic weapons
- Enhance and accelerate CTR, including, in particular, disposal of fissile material
- Enter and complete FMCT negotiations, address existing stocks by undertakings for adequate standards of security
- Establish universal standards for the security of fissile material, including peer review, and assistance – strengthen the Conv. On Phys. Sec.
- Use the NPT Review Process



## Create duties, institutions and means of mutual assistance in nuclear emergencies

- Revisit PSA issue
- Establish duty to assist a state threatened or hit by nuclear terrorism
- Give assistance for technical capacity-building to deal with nuclear and radiological terrorism
- Establish procedures for transborder assistance in emergencies, including NEST, financial, decontamination, and medical help
- Revisit and use Convention on Mutual Assistance in case of nuclear accidents



## The opportunity to establish cooperative security among a heterogeneous group of states is without precedence

- Sept. 11 has defined the main threat to international security and the national security of most states.
- The common interest cuts across traditional groups of like-minded states.
- Not even the strongest state can achieve security alone. The need for cooperation has become obvious.
- The renaissance of multilateralism is possible, but not guaranteed
- Good things don't come by themselves. Right decisions are required.