

V – Other Documents and Declarations (in chronological order)

[Editorial Note: Earlier documents of relevance can be downloaded from
<http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/publications/briefingbook2008.html>

UN Security Council Declaration on Disarmament, Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction

[Reproduced from S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992]

The members of the Council, while fully conscious of the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, reaffirm the crucial contribution which progress in these areas can make to the maintenance of international peace and security. They express their commitment to take concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in these areas.

The members of the Council underline the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction; to avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of arms; and to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems concerning these matters threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability. They emphasize the importance of the early ratification and implementation by the States concerned of all international and regional arms control arrangements, especially the START and CFE Treaties.

The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.

On nuclear proliferation, they note the importance of the decision of many countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and emphasize the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. The members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA.

On chemical weapons, they support the efforts of the Geneva Conference with a view to reaching agreement on the conclusion, by the end of 1992, of a universal convention, including a verification regime, to prohibit chemical weapons.

International Court of Justice: *Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations)

[Reproduced from Communiqué No. 96/23,
8 July 1996]

Advisory Opinion

The Hague, July 8 1996. The International Court of Justice today handed down its Advisory Opinion on the request made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the above case. The final paragraph of the Opinion reads as follows:

'For these reasons,

THE COURT

- (1) By thirteen votes to one,
Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion:
 IN FAVOUR: *President* Bedjaoui; *Vice-President* Schwebel;
Judges Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva,
 Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari
 Bravo, Higgins;
 AGAINST: *Judge* Oda.
- (2) *Replies* in the following manner to the question put by the
 General Assembly:
 - A. Unanimously,
 There is in neither customary nor conventional international
 law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear
 weapons;
 - B. By eleven votes to three,

There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such, IN FAVOUR: *President* Bedjaoui; *Vice-President* Schwebel; *Judges* Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

AGAINST: *Judges* Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma.

- C. Unanimously,
 A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;
- D. Unanimously,
 A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;
- E. By seven votes to seven [see corrigendum below – ed.], It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;
 IN FAVOUR: *President* Bedjaoui; *Judges* Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo; AGAINST: *Vice-President* Schwebel; *Judges* Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins.
- F. Unanimously,
 There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control'.

The Court was composed as follows: *President* Bedjaoui, *Vice-President* Schwebel; *Judges* Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; *Registrar* Valencia-Ospi na. *President* Bedjaoui, *Judges* Herczegh, Shi, Vereshchetin and Ferrari Bravo appended declarations to the Advisory Opinion of the Court; *Judges* Guillaume, Ranjeva and Fleischhauer appended separate opinions; *Vice-President* Schwebel, *Judges* Oda, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma and Higgins appended dissenting opinions.

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Corrigendum to Press Communiqué No. 96/23

On page 2 of Press Communiqué No. 96/23, the first line of point (2) E. of the final paragraph of the Opinion should read as follows:

E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote,

Annex to Press Communiqué No. 96/23

Declaration of President Bedjaoui

After having pointed out that paragraph E. of the operative part was adopted by seven votes to seven, with his own casting vote, President Bedjaoui began by stressing that the Court had been extremely meticulous and had shown an acute sense of its responsibilities when proceeding to consider all the aspects of the complex question put to it by the General Assembly. He indicated that the Court had, however, had to find that in the current state of international law, the question was one to which it was unfortunately not in a position to give a clear answer. In his view, the Advisory Opinion thus rendered does at least have the merit of pointing to the imperfections of international law and inviting the States to correct them.

President Bedjaoui indicated that the fact that the Court was unable to go any further should not 'in any way be interpreted as leaving the way open to the recognition of the lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons'. According to him, the Court does no more than place on record the existence of a legal uncertainty. After having observed that the voting of the Members of the Court on paragraph E. of the operative part is not the reflection of any geographical dividing line, he gives the reasons that led him to approve the pronouncement of the Court.

To that end, he began by emphasizing the particularly exacting nature of international law and the way in which it is designed to be applied in all circumstances. More specifically, he concluded that *'the very nature of this blind weapon therefore has a destabilizing effect on humanitarian law which regulates discernment in the type of weapon used. Nuclear weapons, the ultimate evil, destabilize humanitarian law which is the law of the lesser evil. The existence of nuclear weapons is therefore a challenge to the very existence of humanitarian law, not to mention their long-term effects of damage to the human environment, in respect to which the right to life can be exercised'*.

President Bedjaoui considered that 'self-defence — if exercised under extreme circumstances in which the very survival of a State is in question — cannot engender a situation in which a State would exonerate itself from compliance with the 'intransgressible' norms of international humanitarian law'. According to him it would be very rash to accord, without any hesitation, a higher priority to the survival of a State than to the survival of humanity itself.

As the ultimate objective of any action in the field of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament, President Bedjaoui concludes by stressing the importance of the obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament — which the Court has moreover recognized. He considers for his part that it is possible to go beyond the conclusions of the Court in this regard and to assert 'that there in fact exists a twofold *general obligation*, opposable *erga omnes*, to negotiate in good faith and to achieve a specified result'; in other words, given the at least formally unanimous support for that object, that obligation has now — in his view — assumed customary force.

Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda

[Declaration by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998]

1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states, as well as by those three nuclear-weapon-capable states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use of threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.
2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used — accidentally or by decision — defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again."
3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 — in its very first resolution — unanimously called for a commission to make proposals for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." While we can rejoice at the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.
4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.
5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistent reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.
8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.
9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches.
11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.
12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-Off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.
13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of controls over all

fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.

14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a joint no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security assurances.

15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon states together with the non-nuclear-weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

[Statement by the G8 Summit (Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US), Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, 26–27 June 2002]

I. Statement by G8 Leaders

The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of non-proliferation principles we have announced today.

In a major initiative to implement those principles, we have also decided today to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this Global Partnership. We have adopted a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements for new projects, that will apply with immediate effect, to ensure effective and efficient project development, coordination and implementation. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.

Recognizing that this Global Partnership will enhance international security and safety, we invite other countries that are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions with us on participating in and contributing to this initiative. We will review progress on this Global Partnership at our next Summit in 2003.

The G8 Global Partnership: Principles to Prevent Terrorists, or Those that Harbour Them, from Gaining Access to Weapons or Materials of Mass Destruction

The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.

1. Promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items; strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments.

2. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for and secure these items.

3. Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures applied to facilities which house such items, including defence in depth; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect their facilities.

4. Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.

5. Develop, review and maintain effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists, as well as items that are not identified on such lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, with particular consideration of end-user, catch-all and brokering aspects; provide assistance to states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to develop their export and transshipment control systems in this regard.

6. Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) non-proliferation, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) nuclear safety (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the Partnership.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

i. Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;

ii. The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;

iii. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;

iv. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of

implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;

v. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;

vi. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;

vii. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;

viii. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and

ix. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be coordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms.

For the purposes of these guidelines, the phrase "new or expanded cooperation projects" is defined as cooperation projects that will be initiated or enhanced on the basis of this Global Partnership. All funds disbursed or released after its announcement would be included in the total of committed resources. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership's initial geographic focus will be on projects in Russia, which maintains primary responsibility for implementing its obligations and requirements within the Partnership.

In addition, the G8 would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries, including those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the guidelines, for inclusion in the Partnership.

Recognizing that the Global Partnership is designed to enhance international security and safety, the G8 invites others to contribute to and join in this initiative.

With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of our next Summit.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

[Reproduced from S/RES/1540,
adopted on 28 April 2004]

The Security Council,

Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or

biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,

Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides that* all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

2. *Decides also* that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

3. *Decides also* that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

- (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
- (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
- (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when

necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;

5. *Decides* that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

6. *Recognizes* the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

7. *Recognizes* that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;

8. *Calls upon* all States:

(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties;

(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;

(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

9. *Calls upon* all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;

10. Further to counter that threat, *calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

11. *Expresses* its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:

– Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.

– Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.

– Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Global Threat Reduction Initiative Highlights

[Summary of initiative, GTRI announced by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham at the IAEA, 26 May 2004]

Background:

On February 11, 2004, President Bush stated in a speech at the National Defense University that the greatest risk to the United States or anywhere else in the world is the possibility of a nuclear or radiological materials terrorist attack. The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) has several ongoing efforts to combat this threat. In the latest step to increase effectiveness in preventing nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or other rogue actors, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).

The mission of the GTRI is to remove and/or secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a threat to the United States and to the international community. This initiative will comprehensively address all vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials throughout the world and secure and/or remove these materials and equipment of concern as expeditiously as possible.

To carry out the Initiative, the Secretary has directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to consolidate and accelerate the Department's nuclear materials removal efforts, and complete a comprehensive inventory of research reactors and vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide to rapidly identify and address any gaps in current security coverage and recovery or removal efforts. Under the Initiative, which will include the establishment of a new office under the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Department will further refine its threat-based, prioritized approach to better address the materials of proliferation concern around the world. The Department of Energy will then work to systematically address each facility that possesses high-risk fissile and other nuclear materials. The Initiative will be carried out in close cooperation with other U. S. Government agencies such as the Department of State, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and other global partners.

Program Description:

NNSA will consolidate, accelerate, and expand under centralized management the Department's current programs related to nuclear materials removal and radioactive source security and recovery:

- Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRFR) Program
 - Eliminates stockpiles of Russian-origin HEU by assisting eligible countries to convert their research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel upon availability and qualification.
- Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program
 - Targets research reactors and medical isotope production processes worldwide for conversion to suitable LEU fuels and targets.
- Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRSNF) Acceptance Program
 - Eliminates stockpiles of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors through repatriation to the United States.
- Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) Program
 - Identifies, recovers, and stores, on an interim-basis, certain domestic radioactive sealed sources as well as other radiological materials that pose a security risk to the United States and/or world community.

- Reduces the international threat posed by radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or 'dirty bomb.'

This new Initiative also will establish a comprehensive global database to identify and prioritize nuclear materials and equipment of proliferation concern not being addressed by existing threat reduction efforts.

- Global Research Reactor Security Study
 - Conduct a review of research reactors and associated facilities worldwide and develop a preliminary risk assessment of materials and sites relative to vulnerability to sabotage, theft, or terrorist attack.

To better address removal efforts, this Initiative also provides for a newly-formed Global Materials Recovery Team that will pre-position equipment and designate personnel for urgent nuclear materials recovery operations. The Initiative combines radioactive source security and recovery efforts with nuclear materials security and removal efforts to maximize synergies among programs. In many cases, vulnerable nuclear materials and radioactive sources are co-located at civilian research reactors worldwide.

The G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation

[Adopted on 9 June 2004 at G-8 Summit
at Sea Island, Georgia, US]

At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy and multi-faceted approaches.

Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back proliferation, today, at Sea Island, we announce an action plan to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. We will work together with other concerned states to realize this plan.

All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these commitments under the relevant multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage states in effectively implementing their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, in particular implementing domestically their obligations under such treaties, building law enforcement capacity, and establishing effective export controls. We call on all states that have not already done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling on all states to establish effective national export controls, to adopt and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation, to take cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in such weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. We call on all states to implement this resolution promptly and fully, and we are prepared to assist them in so doing, thereby helping to fight the nexus between terrorism and proliferation, and black markets in these weapons and related materials.

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation

The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that may be used for weapons purposes are a threat to us all. Some states seek uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs contrary to their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and technology. We announce the following new actions to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

- To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported to states that may seek to use

them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. The export of such items should only occur pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall work to amend appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future. We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next G-8 Summit. In aid of this process, for the intervening year, we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, including nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions, for all states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments and standards.

- We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support.
- The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of 2005.
- We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with states that violate their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the Security Council.
- To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This committee would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification. We believe this committee should be made up of member states in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.
- Likewise, we believe that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee regarding their own cases.

2. Proliferation Security Initiative

We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support worldwide for PSI, which now includes all G-8 members. The Krakow meeting commemorating PSI's first anniversary, attended by 62 countries, evidences growing global support.

We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants, laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law. Several of us are already developing mechanisms to deny access to our ports and airports for companies and impose visa bans on individuals involved in illicit trade.

We encourage all states to strengthen and expand national and international measures to respond to clandestine procurement activities. Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance in improving their national capabilities to meet international norms.

3. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Since its launch by G-8 Leaders two years ago at Kananaskis, the Global Partnership has become a significant force worldwide to enhance international safety and security. Global Partnership member states, including the six new donors that joined at Evian, have in the past year launched new cooperative projects in Russia and accelerated progress on those already underway. While much has been accomplished, significant challenges remain. We recommit ourselves to our Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines as the basis for Global Partnership cooperation.

- We recommit ourselves to raising up to \$20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.
- Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor countries is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure the effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to join.
- We will continue to work with other former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership. We reaffirm that Partnership states will participate in projects according to their national interests and resources.
- We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges worldwide. We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past WMD programs. We also support projects to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.

4. Nonproliferation Challenges

- The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, which is unprecedented; its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, including through both its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium enrichment programs, in violation of its international obligations; and its established history of missile proliferation are serious concerns to us all. We strongly support the Six-Party Process, and strongly urge the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
- We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note that since Evian, Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has committed itself to cooperate with the Agency, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge the areas of progress reported by the Director General, we are, however, deeply concerned that Iran's suspension of enrichment-related activity is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program.
- We welcome Libya's strategic decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles, to fully comply with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile Technology Control Regime. We note Libya has cooperated in the removal of nuclear equipment and materials and taken steps to eliminate chemical weapons. We call on Libya to continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

5. Defending Against Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to: expand

or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In this context, we seek concrete realization of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation against biological weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists. Its prohibitions should be fully implemented, including enactment of penal legislation. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC promptly.

6. Chemical Weapons Proliferation

We support full implementation of the CWC, including its nonproliferation aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the CWC promptly, and will work with them to this end. We also urge CWC States Parties to undertake national legislative and administrative measures for its full implementation. We support the use of all fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.

7. Implementation of the Evian Initiative on Radioactive Source Security

At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive sources to prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial progress toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved a revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in September 2003. We urge all states to implement the Code and recognize it as a global standard.

We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized end-users in states that can control them. States should ensure that no sources are diverted for illicit use. We seek prompt IAEA approval of this guidance to ensure that effective controls are operational by the end of 2005 and applied in a harmonized and consistent manner. We support the IAEA's program for assistance to ensure that all countries can meet the new standards.

8. Nuclear Safety and Security

Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chernobyl, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the site. We have already made a large financial contribution to build a safe confinement over the remnants of the Chernobyl reactor. We are grateful for the participation and contributions made by 21 other states in this effort. Today, we endorse international efforts to raise the remaining funds necessary to complete the project. We urge Ukraine to support and work closely with us to complete the confinement's construction by 2008 in a way that contributes to radiological safety, in particular in Ukraine and neighboring regions.

An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system is essential for our safety and security. We affirm the importance for national regulators to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence.

"Seven Steps to Raise World Security" Statement by Mohamed ElBaradei

[Posted on the IAEA website, 2 February 2005]

Four months from now, in New York, the world will have a rare opportunity to make significant improvements in international security. The question is whether we will be smart enough to use it.

In recent years, three phenomena have radically altered the security landscape. They are the emergence of a nuclear black market, the determined efforts by more countries to acquire technology to produce the fissile material useable in nuclear weapons and the clear desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

We have been trying to solve these new problems with existing tools. But for every step forward, we have exposed vulnerabilities in the system. The system itself - the regime that implements the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) - needs reinforcement. Some of the necessary remedies can be taken in May, but only if governments are ready to act.

The opportunity in New York will come in the form of a conference. If that sounds like yet more bureaucracy - addressing nightmarish nuclear security scenarios with more meetings - I sympathise. But this is no ordinary conference. Every five years, the NPT Review Conference brings world leaders together to focus on combating the threat of nuclear weapons. All but four countries will participate as treaty members. Given the global nature of the threats, these four - India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea - should also be encouraged to contribute their insights and concerns.

With seven straightforward steps, and without amending the treaty, this conference could reach a milestone in strengthening world security. The first step: put a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. There is no compelling reason to build more of these facilities; the nuclear industry has more than enough capacity to fuel its power plants and research centres. To make this holding period acceptable for everyone, commit the countries that already have the facilities to guarantee an economic supply of nuclear fuel for bona fide uses. Then use the hiatus to develop better long-term options for managing the technologies (for example, in regional centres under multinational control). To advance these ideas, I have engaged a group of international nuclear experts, and their proposals will be put forward at the conference.

Second, speed up existing efforts, led by the US global threat reduction initiative and others, to modify the research reactors worldwide operating with highly enriched uranium - particularly those with metal fuel that could be readily employed as bomb material. Convert these reactors to use low-enriched uranium, and accelerate research on how to make highly enriched uranium unnecessary for all peaceful nuclear applications.

Third, raise the bar for inspection standards by establishing the "additional protocol" as the norm for verifying compliance with the NPT. Without the expanded authority of this protocol, the International Atomic Energy Agency's rights of inspection are limited. It has proven its value recently in Iran and Libya and should be brought into force for all countries.

Fourth, call on the United Nations Security Council to act swiftly and decisively in the case of any country that withdraws from the NPT, in terms of the threat the withdrawal poses to international peace and security.

Fifth, urge states to act on the Security Council's recent resolution 1540, to pursue and prosecute any illicit trading in nuclear material and technology.

Sixth, call on the five nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accelerate implementation of their "unequivocal commitment" to nuclear disarmament, building on efforts such as the 2002 Moscow treaty between Russia and the US. Negotiating a treaty to ban irreversibly the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons programmes would be a welcome start.

Last, acknowledge the volatility of longstanding tensions that give rise to proliferation, in regions such as the Middle East and the Korean peninsula, and take action to resolve existing security problems and, where needed, provide security assurances. In the Middle East, urge all parties to pursue a dialogue on regional security as part of the peace process. One goal of this dialogue would be to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

None of these steps will work in isolation. Each requires a concession from someone. But with leadership from all sides, this package of proposals will create gains for everyone. This opportunity will come again - in 2010. But given current trends, we cannot afford to wait another five years. As a UN panel put it recently: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation." The stakes are too high to risk inaction.

Executive Summary of 'Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle': Expert Group Report Submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

[Reproduced from INFCIRC 640, 22 February 2005]

[Editorial note: The Expert group Report is available in its entirety on the IAEA website

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/infircs/2005/infirc640.pdf>]

Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs)

Executive Summary

1. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime has been successful in limiting, albeit not entirely preventing, the further spread of nuclear weapons. The vast majority of States have legally pledged to forego the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have abided by that commitment. Nonetheless, the past few years have been a tumultuous and difficult period.
2. The decades long nuclear non-proliferation effort is under threat: from regional arms races; from actions by non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) that have been found to be in fundamental breach of, or in non-compliance with their safeguards agreement, and which have not taken full corrective measures; from the incomplete manner in which export controls required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have been applied; from burgeoning and alarmingly well-organised nuclear supply networks; and from the increasing risk of acquisition of nuclear or other radioactive materials by terrorist and other non-State entities.
3. A different significant factor is that the civilian nuclear industry appears to be poised for worldwide expansion. Rapidly growing global demand for electricity, the uncertainty of supply and price of natural gas, soaring prices for oil, concerns about air pollution and the immense challenge of lowering greenhouse gas emissions, are all forcing a fresh look at nuclear power. As the technical and organisational foundations of nuclear safety improve, there is increasing confidence in the safety of nuclear power plants. In light of existing, new and reawakened interest in many regions of the world, the prospect of new nuclear power stations on a large scale is therefore real. A greater number of States will consider developing their own fuel cycle facilities and nuclear know-how, and will seek assurances of supply in materials, services and technologies.
4. In response to the growing emphasis being placed on international cooperation to cope with non-proliferation and security concerns, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, appointed in June 2004 an international group of experts (participating in their personal capacity) to consider possible multilateral approaches to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.
5. The mandate of the Expert Group was three-fold:
 - To identify and provide an analysis of issues and options relevant to multilateral approaches to the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle;
 - To provide an overview of the policy, legal, security, economic, institutional and technological incentives and disincentives for cooperation in multilateral arrangements for the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle; and
 - To provide a brief review of the historical and current experiences and analyses relating to multilateral fuel cycle arrangements relevant to the work of the expert group.
6. Two primary deciding factors dominate all assessments of multilateral nuclear approaches, namely "**Assurance of non-proliferation**" and "**Assurance of supply and services**". Both are recognised overall objectives for governments and for the NPT community. In practice, each of these two objectives can seldom be achieved fully on its own. History has shown that it is even more difficult to find an optimum arrangement that will satisfy both objectives at the same time. As a matter of fact, multilateral approaches could be a way to satisfy both objectives.

7. The non-proliferation value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the various proliferation risks associated with a nuclear facility, whether national or multilateral. These risks include the diversion of materials from an MNA (reduced through the presence of a multinational team), the theft of fissile materials, the diffusion of proscribed or sensitive technologies from MNAs to unauthorised entities, the development of clandestine parallel programmes and the breakout scenario. The latter refers to the case of the host country "breaking out", for example, by expelling multinational staff, withdrawing from the NPT (and thereby terminating its safeguards agreement), and operating the multilateral facility without international control.

8. The "Assurance of supply" value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the associated incentives, such as the guarantees provided by suppliers, governments and international organisations; the economic benefits that would be gained by countries participating in multilateral arrangements, and the better political and public acceptance for such nuclear projects. One of the most critical steps is to devise effective mechanisms for assurances of supply of material and services, which are commercially competitive, free of monopolies and free of political constraints. Effective assurances of supply would have to include back-up sources of supply in the event that an MNA supplier is unable to provide the required material or services.

Overview of options

9. Whether for uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, or spent fuel disposal and storage, **multilateral options** span the entire field between existing market mechanisms and a complete co-ownership of fuel cycle facilities. The following pattern reflects this diversity:

Type I: Assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities.

- (a) Suppliers provide additional assurances of supply;
- (b) International consortia of governments broaden the assurances;
- (c) IAEA-related arrangements provide even broader assurances.

Type II: Conversion of existing national facilities to multinational facilities.

Type III: Construction of new joint facilities.

10. On the basis of this pattern, the Group has reviewed the pros and cons associated with each type and option. Pros and cons were defined relative to a "non-MNA choice", namely that of a national facility under current safeguards.

Uranium enrichment

11. A healthy market exists at the front end of the fuel cycle. In the course of only two years, a nuclear power plant operating in Finland has bought uranium originating from mines in seven different countries. For example, conversion has been done in three different countries. Enrichment services have been bought from three different companies. Therefore, the legitimate objective of assurances of supply can be fulfilled to a large extent by the market. Nevertheless, this assessment may not be valid for all countries that have concerns about assurances of supply. Mechanisms or measures, under which existing suppliers or international consortia of governments or IAEA-related arrangements may be appropriate in such cases.

12. At first, *suppliers* could provide additional assurances of supply. This would correspond to enrichment plant operators, individually or collectively, guaranteeing to provide enrichment capacity to a State whose government had in turn agreed to forego building its own capacity, but which then found itself denied service by its intended enrichment provider for unspecified reasons. The pros include the avoidance of know-how dissemination, the reliance on a well-functioning market and the ease of implementation. The cons refer for example to the cost of maintaining idle capacity on reserve, and the lack of perceived diversity on the supplier side.

13. At a second level, international *consortia of governments* could step in, that is they would guarantee access to enrichment services, the suppliers being simply executive agents. The arrangement would be a kind of "intergovernmental fuel bank", e.g. a contract under which a government would buy guaranteed

capacity under specified circumstances. Different States might use different mechanisms. Most pros and cons are shared with the preceding case.

14. Then, there are *IAEA-related arrangements*, a variation of the preceding option, with the IAEA acting as the anchor of the arrangement. Essentially, the Agency would function as a kind of "guarantor" of supply to States in good standing and that were willing to accept the requisite conditionality (which would need to be defined, but would likely need to include foreswearing a parallel path to enrichment/reprocessing plus acceptance of the Additional Protocol for NNWS). The IAEA might either hold title to the material to be supplied or, more likely, act as facilitator, with back-up agreements between the IAEA and supplier countries to fulfil commitments made by the IAEA effectively on their behalf. In effect, the IAEA would be establishing a default mechanism, only to be activated in instances where a normal supply contract had broken down for reasons other than commercial reasons. The suggested pros and cons are therefore similar, with the added value of broad international assurances. Several questions can be raised with respect to the IAEA and its special status as an international organisation subject to the control of its Member-States. Any guarantee provided by the IAEA would in fact require approval by its Board of Governors.

15. Where an MNA would take the form of a joint facility, there are two ready-made precedents, the Anglo-Dutch-German company Urenco and the French EURODIF. The experience of Urenco, with its commercial/industrial management on the one hand and the governmental Joint Committee on the other hand, has shown that the multinational concept can be made to work successfully. Under this model, strong oversight of technology and staffing, as well as effective safeguards and proper international division of expertise can reduce the risk of proliferation and even make a unilateral breakout extremely difficult. EURODIF on the other hand has a successful multinational record as well, by enriching uranium only in one country, while providing enriched uranium to its co-financing international partners, hence restricting all proliferation risks, diversion, clandestine parallel programme, breakout and the spread of technology.

Reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel

16. Taking into account present capacities to reprocess spent fuel for light water reactors and those under construction, there will be sufficient reprocessing capacity globally for all expected demands in plutonium-recycled fuel during some two decades. Therefore, objectives of assurances of supply can be fulfilled to a large extent without new reprocessing facilities involving ownerships (Types II and III).

17. Currently all reprocessing plants are essentially State-owned. By the very nature of the nuclear business worldwide, any guarantee from a supplier would have the implicit or explicit agreement of the corresponding government. As to *IAEA-brokered arrangements*, these could mean an IAEA participation in the supervision of an international consortium for reprocessing services.

18. *Converting a national facility* to international ownership and management would involve the creation of a new international entity that would operate as a new competitor in the reprocessing market. The pros reflect the advantages of bringing together international expertise, while the cons include non-proliferation disadvantages related to know-how dissemination and to the return of the separated plutonium. Other cons deal with the fact that, of the existing facilities, all except two Japanese facilities are in NWS or in non-NPT States. In many of those cases, appropriate safeguards will have to be introduced if they had not been applied before.

19. As noted above, the *construction of new joint facilities* will not be needed for a long time. Therefore, a prerequisite for the construction of new facilities is the demand for additional reprocessing and for recycled-plutonium fabrication. In the future such reprocessing and fabrication would be done on the same location.

Spent fuel disposal

20. At present there is no international market for spent fuel disposal services, as all undertakings are strictly national. The final

disposal of spent fuel is thus a candidate for multilateral approaches. It offers major economic benefits and substantial non-proliferation benefits, although it presents legal, political and public acceptance challenges in many countries. The Agency should continue its efforts in that direction by working on all the underlying factors, and by assuming political leadership to encourage such undertakings.

21. The final disposal of spent fuel (and radioactive waste as well) in shared repositories must be looked at as only one element of a broader strategy of parallel options. National solutions will remain a first priority in many countries. This is the only approach for States with many nuclear power plants in operation or in past operation. For others with smaller civilian nuclear programmes, a dual-track approach is needed in which both national and international solutions are pursued. Small countries should keep options open (national, regional or international), be it only to maintain a minimum national technical competence necessary to act in an international context.

Spent fuel storage

22. Storage facilities for spent fuel are in operation and are being built in several countries. There is no international market for services in this area, except for the readiness of the Russian Federation to receive Russian-supplied fuel, and with a possible offer to do so for other spent fuel. The storage of spent fuel is also a candidate for multilateral approaches, primarily at the regional level. Storage of special nuclear materials in a few safe and secure facilities would enhance safeguards and physical protection. The IAEA should continue investigations in that field and encourage such undertakings. Various countries with state-of-the-art storage facilities in operation should step forward and accept spent fuel from others for interim storage.

Combined option: fuel-leasing/fuel take-back

23. In this model, the leasing State provides the fuel through an arrangement with its own nuclear fuel “vendors”. At the time the government of the leasing State issues an export license to its fuel “vendor” corporation to send fresh fuel to a client reactor, that government would also announce its plan for the management of that fuel once discharged. Without a specific spent fuel management scheme by the leasing State, the lease deal will of course not take place. The leased fuel once removed from the reactor and cooled down, could either be returned to its country of origin which owns title to it, or, through an IAEA-brokered deal could be sent to a third party State or to a multinational or a regional fuel cycle centre located elsewhere for storage and ultimate disposal.

24. The weak part in the arrangement outlined above is the willingness, indeed the political capability, of the leasing State to take-back the spent fuel it has provided under the lease contract. It could well be politically difficult for any State to accept spent fuel not coming from its own reactors (that is, reactors producing electricity for the direct benefit of its own citizens). Yet, to make any lease-take-back deal credible, an ironclad guarantee of spent fuel removal from the country where it was used must be provided, otherwise the entire arrangement is moot. In this respect, States with suitable disposal sites, and with grave concerns about proliferation risks, ought to be proactive in putting forward solutions. Of course, commitment of client States to forego enrichment and reprocessing would make such undertakings politically more tolerable.

25. As an alternative, the IAEA could broker the creation of multinational or regional spent fuel storage facilities, where spent fuel owned by leasing States and burned elsewhere could be sent. The IAEA could thus become an active participant in regional spent fuel storage facilities, or third party spent fuel disposal schemes, thereby making lease-take-back fuel supply arrangements more credible propositions.

Overarching issues

26. Apart from the cross-cutting factors related to the implementation of MNAs, such as the technical, legal and safeguards ones, there are a number of overarching issues, primarily of a broad political nature, which may have a bearing upon perceptions of the feasibility and desirability of MNAs. These issues may be decisive in any future endeavour to develop, assess

and implement such approaches at the national and international level.

Relevant articles of the NPT

27. The NPT incorporates a political bargain with respect to peaceful uses and nuclear disarmament without which the Treaty would not have been adopted nor received the widespread adherence it obtained afterwards. The promise by all States parties to cooperate in the further development of nuclear energy and for the NWS to work towards disarmament provided the basis for NNWS to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons.

28. Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which had earlier provided the basis for the foundation of the IAEA, is embodied in Article IV, which stipulates that nothing shall be interpreted as affecting the “inalienable right of all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II” (that specify the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty). Furthermore, that same article specifies that all Parties to the NPT shall undertake to “facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”, and moreover to “cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...” Article IV was specifically crafted to preclude any attempt to reinterpret the NPT so as to inhibit a country’s right to nuclear technologies - so long as the technology is used for peaceful purposes.

29. NNWS have expressed dissatisfaction about what they increasingly view as a growing imbalance in the NPT: that, through the imposition of restrictions on the supply of materials and equipment of the nuclear fuel cycle by the NWS and the advanced industrial NNWS, those States have backed away from their original guarantee to facilitate the fullest possible exchange referred to in Article IV and to assist all NNWS in the development of the applications of nuclear energy. There are also concerns that additional constraints on Article IV might be imposed,

30. Article VI of the Treaty obliges NWS Parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Many NNWS deem the implementation of Article VI of the NPT by NWS as unsatisfactory, as are the non-entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the stalemate in the negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FM(C)T). Such concerns have fostered a conviction among many NNWS that the NPT bargain is being corroded.

Safeguards and export controls

31. Some States have argued that, if the objective of MNAs is merely to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime then, rather than focussing on MNAs, it may be better to concentrate instead on the existing elements of the regime itself, for example, by seeking the universality of the Additional Protocol (AP) to IAEA safeguards agreements and by the universalisation of safeguards agreements and multilateral export controls.

32. The risks involved in the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies should primarily be addressed by an efficient and cost-effective safeguards system. The IAEA and regional safeguards systems have done an outstanding job in these matters. Safeguards, rationally and well applied, have been the most efficient way to detect and deter further proliferation and to provide States Parties with an opportunity to assure others that they are in conformity with their safeguards commitments. Of course, advances in technologies require safeguards to be strengthened and updated, while protecting commercial, technological and industrial secrets. The adoption of the Additional Protocol, and its judicious implementation based on State-level analysis, are essential steps against further nuclear proliferation. The Additional Protocol has proven to provide additional, necessary and effective verification tools, while protecting legitimate national interests in security and confidentiality. Sustained application of the Additional Protocol in a State can provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared materials and activities in that State. Together with a comprehensive

safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol should become the de facto safeguards standard.

33. The above notwithstanding, the IAEA should endeavour to further strengthen the implementation of safeguards. For example, it should revisit three facets of its verification system:

- a. The technical annexes of the Additional Protocol, which should be regularly updated to reflect the continuing development of nuclear techniques and technologies.
- b. The implementation of the AP, which requires adequate resources and a firm commitment to apply it decisively. It should be recalled that the Model Additional Protocol commits the IAEA not to apply the AP in a mechanistic or systematic way. Therefore the IAEA should allocate its resources on problematic areas rather than on States using the largest amounts of nuclear material.
- c. The enforcement mechanisms in case of fundamental breach of, or in case of non-compliance with, the safeguards agreement. Are these mechanisms progressive enough to act as an effective deterrent? Further consideration should be given by the IAEA to appropriate measures to handle various degrees of violations.

34. Export guidelines and their implementation are an important line of defence for preventing proliferation. Recent events have shown that criminal networks can find ways around existing controls to supply clandestine activities. Yet, one should remember that all States party to the NPT are obliged, pursuant to Article III.2 thereof, to implement export controls. This obligation was reinforced by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) that requires all States to enact and implement export controls to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials to non-State actors. The participation in the development and implementation of export controls should be broadened, and multilaterally-agreed export controls should be developed in a transparent manner, engaging all States.

35. In fact, the primary technical barriers against proliferation remain the effective and universal implementation of IAEA safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and effective export controls. Both must be as strong as possible on their own merits. MNAs will be complementary mechanisms for strengthening the existing non-proliferation regime.

Voluntary participation in MNAs versus a binding norm

36. The present legal framework does not oblige countries to participate in MNAs, as the political environment makes it unlikely that such a norm can be established any time soon. Establishing MNAs resting on **voluntary** participation is thus the more promising way to proceed. In a voluntary arrangement covering assurances of supply, recipient countries would, at least for the duration of the respective supply contract, renounce the construction and operation of sensitive fuel cycle facilities and accept safeguards of the highest current standards including comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Where the demarcation line between permitted R&D activities and renounced development and construction activities has to be drawn is a matter for further consideration. In voluntary MNAs involving facilities, the participating countries would presumably commit to carry out the related activities solely under the common MNA framework.

37. In reality, countries will enter into such multilateral arrangements according to the economic and political incentives and disincentives offered by these arrangements. A political environment of mutual trust and consensus among the partners - based on full compliance with the agreed nuclear non-proliferation obligations of the partners - will be necessary to the successful negotiation, creation and operation of an MNA.

38. Beyond this, a new **binding** international norm stipulating that sensitive fuel cycle activities are to be conducted exclusively in the context of MNAs and no longer as a national undertaking would amount to a change in the scope of Article IV of the NPT. The wording and negotiation history of this article emphasise the right of each party in good standing to choose its national fuel cycle on the basis of its sovereign consideration. This right is not independent of the faithful abiding by the undertakings under Articles I and II. But if this condition is met, no legal barrier stands in the way of each

State party to pursue all fuel cycle activities on a national basis. Waiving this right would thus change the "bargain" of the NPT.

39. Such a fundamental change is not impossible if the parties were to agree on it in a broader negotiating frame. For NNWS, such a new bargain can probably only be realised through universal principles applying to all States and after additional steps by the NWS regarding nuclear disarmament. In addition, a verifiable FM(C)T might also be one of the preconditions for binding multilateral obligations; such a treaty would terminate the right of any participating nuclear weapon States and non-NPT parties to run reprocessing and enrichment facilities for nuclear explosive purposes and it would bring them to the same level - with regard to such activities - as non-nuclear weapon States. The new restrictions would apply to all States and facilities related to the technologies involved, without exception. At that time, multilateral arrangements could become a universal, binding principle. The question may also be raised as to what might be the conditions required by NWS and non-NPT States to commit to binding MNAs involving them.

Nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT States

40. Weapon-usable material (stocks and flows) and sensitive facilities that are capable of producing such material are located predominantly in the NWS and non-NPT States. The concerns raised previously for MNAs in NNWS do not all apply when an MNA would involve NWS or non-NPT States. Yet, one of the questions here relates to the possibility that the nuclear material produced in an MNA could contribute to such a State's nuclear non-peaceful programme. This shows again the relevance of a FM(C)T.

41. The feasibility of bringing NWS and non-NPT States into MNAs should indeed be considered at an early stage. As long as MNAs remain voluntary, nothing would preclude such States from participating in an MNA. In fact, France (in connection with the EURODIF arrangement) and the United Kingdom (in connection with Urenco) are examples of such participation. In transforming existing civilian facilities into MNAs subject to safeguards and security requirements, such States would demonstrate their support for non-proliferation and for peaceful international nuclear collaboration.

Enforcement

42. Eventually, the success of all efforts to improve the nuclear non-proliferation regime depends upon the effectiveness of compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement measures in case of non-compliance can be partially improved by MNAs' legal provisions, which will carefully specify a definition of what constitutes a violation, by whom such violations will be ruled on, and enforcement measures that could be directly applied by the partners in addition to broader political tools.

43. Nevertheless, enhanced safeguards, MNAs, or new undertakings by States will not serve their full purpose if the international community does not respond with determination to serious cases of non-compliance, be it diversion, clandestine activities or breakout. Responses are needed at four levels, depending upon the specific case: the MNA partners of the non-compliant State; the IAEA; the States Parties to the NPT; and the UN Security Council. Where these do not currently exist, appropriate procedures and measures must be available and must be made use of at all four levels to cope with breaches and non-compliance instances, in order to unequivocally make clear that States violating treaties and arrangements should not be permitted to do so unimpeded.

Multilateral nuclear approaches: the future

44. Past initiatives for multilateral nuclear cooperation did not result in any tangible results. Proliferation concerns were perceived as not serious enough. Economic incentives were seldom strong enough. Concerns about assurances of supply were paramount. National pride also played a role, alongside expectations about the technological and economic spin-offs to be derived from nuclear activities. Many of those considerations may still be pertinent. However, the result of balancing those considerations today, in the face of a latent multiplication of nuclear facilities over the next decades and the possible increase in proliferation dangers may well produce a political environment more conducive to MNAs in

the 21st century.

45. The potential benefits of MNAs for the non-proliferation regime are both symbolic and practical. As a confidence-building measure, multilateral approaches can provide enhanced assurance to the partners and to the international community that the most sensitive parts of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are less vulnerable to misuse for weapon purposes. Joint facilities with multinational staff put all MNA participants under a greater degree of scrutiny from peers and partners and may also constitute an obstacle against a breakout by the host partner. They also reduce the number of sites where sensitive facilities are operated, thereby curbing proliferation risks, and diminishing the number of locations subject to potential thefts of sensitive material. Moreover, these approaches can even help in creating a better acceptance for the continued use of nuclear power and for nuclear applications, and enhance the prospects for the safe and environmentally sound storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

46. As far as assurances of supply are concerned, multilateral approaches could also provide the benefits of cost-effectiveness and economies of scale for whole regions, for smaller countries or for those with limited resources. Similar benefits have been derived in the context of other technology sectors, such as aviation and aerospace. However, the case to be made in favour of MNAs is not entirely straightforward. States with differing levels of technology, different degrees of institutionalisation, economic development and resources and competing political considerations may not all reach the same conclusions as to the benefits, convenience and desirability of MNAs. Some might argue that multilateral approaches point to the loss or limitation of State sovereignty and independent ownership and control of a key technology sector, leaving unfairly the commercial benefits of these technologies to just a few countries. Others might argue that multilateral approaches could lead to further dissemination of, or loss of control over, sensitive nuclear technologies, and result in higher proliferation risks.

47. In summary, the Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle has reviewed the various aspects of the fuel cycle, identified a number of options for MNAs deserving further consideration, and noted a number of pros and cons for each of the options. It is hoped that the report of the Expert Group will serve as a building block, or as a milestone. It is not intended to mark the end of the road. MNAs offer a potentially useful contribution to meeting prevailing concerns about assurances of supply and non-proliferation.

48. The Group recommends that steps be taken to strengthen overall controls on the nuclear fuel cycle and the transfer of technology, including safeguards and export controls: the former by promoting universal adherence to Additional Protocols, the latter through a more stringent implementation of guidelines and a universal participation in their development.

49. In order to maintain momentum, the Group recommends that attention be given - by the IAEA Member States, by the IAEA itself, by the nuclear industry and by other nuclear organisations - to multilateral nuclear approaches in general and to the **five approaches** suggested below.

Five suggested approaches

The objective of increasing non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, while preserving assurances of supply and services around the world could be achieved through a set of gradually introduced multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA):

1. Reinforcing **existing commercial market mechanisms** on a case-by-case basis through long-term contracts and transparent suppliers' arrangements with government backing. Examples would be: fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, as well as commercial fuel banks.
2. Developing and implementing **international supply guarantees** with IAEA participation. Different models should be investigated, notably with the **IAEA as guarantor** of service supplies, e.g. as administrator of a fuel bank.
3. Promoting voluntary conversion of **existing facilities to MNAs**, and pursuing them as **confidence-building measures**,

with the participation of NPT non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, and non-NPT States.

4. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, **multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities** based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also serve this objective.

5. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might call for the development of a **nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements** – by region or by continent - **and for broader cooperation**, involving the IAEA and the international community.

UN Security Council Resolution 1673

[Reproduced from S/RES/1673 (2006),
adopted 27 April 2006]

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), hereafter the 1540 Committee (S/2006/257), and reaffirming its resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Endorsing the work already carried out by the 1540 Committee, particularly in its consideration of the national reports submitted by States pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004),

Recalling that not all States have presented to the 1540 Committee their reports on the steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004),

Reaffirming its decision that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

Noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, including the adoption of national laws and measures to ensure the implementation of these laws, is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* its decisions in and the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and *emphasizes* the importance for all States to implement fully that resolution;
2. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet presented a first report on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement resolution 1540 (2004) to submit such a report to the 1540 Committee without delay;
3. *Encourages* all States that have submitted such reports to provide, at any time or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
4. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of two years, with the continued assistance of experts, until 27 April 2008;
5. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004) through a work programme which shall include the compilation of information on the status of States' implementation of all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, and which shall address in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution, as well as of paragraph 3 which encompasses (a) accountability, (b) physical protection, (c) border controls and law enforcement efforts and (d) national export and trans-shipment controls including controls on

providing funds and services such as financing to such export and trans-shipment, and in that regard:

(a) *encourages* the pursuit of the ongoing dialogue between the 1540 Committee and States on the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on further actions needed from States to that end and on technical assistance needed and offered;

(b) *invites* the 1540 Committee to explore with States and international, regional and subregional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

6. *Decides* that the 1540 Committee will submit to the Security Council a report no later than 27 April 2008 on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) through the achievement of the implementation of its requirements;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Proliferation Security Initiative, Chairman's Statement

[Warsaw, 23 June 2006]

Members of the international community from around the globe gathered on 23rd June, 2006 in Warsaw at the invitation of the Government of Poland to reaffirm publicly their strong commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative (Cracow PSI), the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and the goal of proactively combating WMD-related trafficking.

This gathering of nations is a resounding testament to the combined will and cooperative spirit of the international community of nations to work together to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. This gathering further demonstrates the consensus of the international community that the nexus of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism constitutes one of the gravest dangers to the global community and demands constant vigilance. This gathering supports enhanced cooperation against proliferation networks and implementation of innovative measures, which will not only stop the transfer of these dangerous items but also act as a deterrent against those who would seek to facilitate such proliferation activities.

The Proliferation Security Initiative was announced on May 31st, 2003 in Cracow. Today, a few short weeks after only the third anniversary of the initiative, participants noted that much has been accomplished, and that PSI is globally recognized as making an important contribution to international efforts to address the security threats posed by WMD and missile proliferation.

First, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Statement on Interdiction Principles have provided an effective platform, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, for impeding and stopping the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The PSI Participating States note in this context that UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) calls upon all states, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.[KP1]

Second, the network of PSI participating states is constantly expanding across the globe. In just three years, the number of states that have expressed support for the PSI Principles and have committed to actively supporting interdiction efforts whenever necessary has increased to more than 75. PSI participating states now hail from every region of the world and, most importantly, from the regions of greatest concern for WMD-related trafficking. This is a vital accomplishment, because the national legal authorities and operational capabilities of PSI participating states serve as the basis for successful interdictions.

Third, PSI participating states have greatly improved their national capacities to interdict shipments of proliferation concern. Over the last three years, countries have undertaken robust efforts to:

- Proactively identify and use existing laws to conduct interdictions, and strengthen laws where necessary,
- Improve interdiction capabilities through multinational training efforts such as live exercises and gaming exercises,
- Improve their national organization for decision-making and operational execution in support of PSI interdictions,
- Establish relationships with key industries to facilitate their cooperation on PSI interdictions, and
- Continue to reach out to those states that have yet to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and to ensure that all PSI participating states can achieve the full benefits of involvement in the Initiative.

Finally, PSI is achieving results. Like-minded nations, working cooperatively, have utilized their national legal authorities and international legal frameworks to successfully stop shipments of WMD- and missile-related materials that, had they reached their destination and end-use, would have aided states and possibly non-state actors of proliferation concern in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

During this meeting, PSI participating states focused on deepening their on-going efforts in all these regards. They stressed the importance of maintaining the operational focus and nature of the PSI Operational Experts process and further developing its regional dimension. They also discussed the efforts of several PSI participating states to disrupt the financial mechanisms that support proliferators. They concluded that each participant should consider how their own national laws and authorities might be utilized or strengthened to identify, track or freeze the assets and transactions of WMD proliferators and their supporters. In addition, the PSI participating states undertook to explore how PSI states can work cooperatively to prevent and disrupt proliferation finance, in furtherance of their obligations under UNSCR 1540 and 1673.

PSI partners will continue to work together toward the objective of stopping the trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. They will also continue to work with those nations that have yet to indicate their support for the PSI, to further broaden the reach of willing partners. PSI Participants recognized that their actions under the PSI in preventing the spread of WMD-related material are having a positive impact on the world in which we live.

Report of the Chairman of the Special Event, Mr. Charles Curtis, at the 50th IAEA General Conference: New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century: Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation, 19-21 September 2006

[Vienna, 22 September 2006]

Overview

At the outset of the 21st century, a discussion is taking place concerning the challenge of meeting increasing global energy demands through a possible expansion of the use of nuclear energy, while at the same time minimizing the proliferation risks created by the further spread of sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. A number of useful suggestions have recently been put forward regarding new approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which aim to establish an assured supply of nuclear fuel, as a back-up measure to the commercial market, in certain situations. In general, these proposals are seen to be mutually compatible with, and supportive of, each other.

These recent proposals for assuring supplies of uranium-based nuclear fuel can be seen as one stage in a broader, longer-term development of a multilateral framework that could encompass assurance of supply mechanisms for both natural and low enriched uranium and nuclear fuel, as well as spent fuel management. Establishing a fully-developed, multilateral framework that is equitable and accessible to all users of nuclear energy, acting in accordance with agreed nuclear non-proliferation norms, will be a complex endeavour that would likely require a progressively phased approach. In general, it is the sense of the Event Chairman that the following could be a possible way forward:

1. a first – near term – phase focusing on establishing mechanisms for assurances of supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear

power plants. Included for examination in the near term phase would be the proposal for an IAEA-owned low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel bank advanced by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the proposal of the six major nuclear fuel supplier States (France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and the proposal of the Russian Federation for international nuclear fuel cycle centres. This near term phase examination should also include the proposals of Japan and the United Kingdom, described as “complementary” to the six major fuel-supplier State initiative, and the proposal of the German Foreign Minister (still under development), as well as any other such proposals that might be elaborated in the near term.

2. a second – mid and long term – phase, focusing on the possibilities of evolving a truly comprehensive multilateral system, integrated with commercial market mechanisms and designed to assure supply adequacy and responsible management and disposition of waste. Included for examination in the mid and longer term phase would be proposals for assured access to power reactor components and technologies and the possibilities for developing future enrichment and reprocessing operations on a multilateral basis and ultimately converting existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities from exclusively national to multinational operations.

The evolution of a fuel assurance framework, in the first phase, would likely entail a step-by-step approach, requiring the IAEA Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, industry and other expert parties, to present proposals to the IAEA Board of Governors, through the Director General, as they mature and as policy, technical and legal issues are worked out.

IAEA Special Event

To facilitate IAEA Member State discussion of recent proposals on assurance of supply mechanisms, with a view to formulating well-structured recommendations regarding the establishment of assurance of supply mechanisms for the consideration of the Board of Governors in 2007, and focusing in the first phase on assurances of supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants, the Director General organized a Special Event entitled “New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation” during the 50th regular session of the IAEA General Conference, from 19 to 21 September 2006 in Vienna. More than 300 participants from 61 Member States and various industry and other organizations took part in the discussions.

The discussions at the Special Event indicated that, in order to move forward, a number of policy, legal and technical issues remain to be addressed in greater detail. It was not the purpose of the Special Event to judge or rank the feasibility of the current proposals put forward by the Director General, States and nongovernmental organizations. Instead, the objective was to constructively identify the possible strengths, weaknesses and opportunities presented, taking advantage of the full range of perspectives represented by the Event attendees.

A Way Forward

May I say from the outset that through the discussions that took place during the Event, great care was taken by all participants to make clear that assurance of supply mechanisms are not intended to alter the right of any State to take its own decision regarding fuel cycle choices. I should also note that a number of participants expressed concerns about implied or intended conditions as may be applied to fuel assurance mechanisms. Finally, I should also add here that the ideas that were generated by those discussions constitute the views of the Event participants. From the discussions during the event, I believe the following issues would benefit from further elaboration.

Why is an assurance of supply mechanism needed?

Proponents of the establishment of an international back-up mechanism for assured supply of nuclear power reactor fuel assert that it would have a dual-objective, i.e. to address: (a) the possible consequences of interruptions of supply of nuclear fuel due to political considerations that might dissuade countries from initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes; and (b) the vulnerabilities that create incentives for building new national

enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Thus, an assurance of supply mechanism would be envisaged solely as a back-up measure to the operation of the commercial market, for those States that want to make use of it, in order to assure supply in instances of interruption for political reasons. It would neither be a substitute for the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels, nor would it deal with disruption of supply due to commercial, technical or other non-political reasons. While an assurance of supply mechanism would be designed to give supply assurance to States that voluntarily choose to rely on international fuel supply, rather than build their own indigenous fuel cycle capabilities, a State availing itself of such a mechanism would not be required to forfeit, or in any way abridge, its rights under Article IV of the NPT, in connection with peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The path forward would benefit from a clear consensus judgment of the proliferation risks associated with increased diversification of enrichment and other fuel cycle capacities. Correspondingly, Board of Governors consideration would benefit from clarification, by each of the proposal sponsors, concerning any explicit or implicit conditionality applicable to eligible beneficiaries of the supply assurance mechanism.

What is to be assured?

From the discussions, it was clear that existing proposals dealt with assurances of supply in different but complementary ways. Some of the proposals focused on assuring supplies of natural uranium and low enriched uranium stocks, and still others focused on assurances of the supply of nuclear fuel itself, through the establishment of a series of interlocking arrangements among major suppliers. Furthermore, it was asserted that there was also a complementary need for greater transparency in uranium markets, and that assured access to a broader range of nuclear reactor technology would be important to operators and countries seeking to reduce the risk of interruptions on political grounds.

It was clear that a fully developed assurance of supply mechanism would comprise several of the ideas advanced which, taken as a whole, are considered mutually supportive and consistent. It is equally clear that this evaluation would need to be phased in over time.

What are the modalities of assurance mechanisms?

The discussions showed that the modalities of possible fuel assurance mechanisms would also need to be assessed. The possible modalities could include: 1) a virtual reserve¹ of natural and low enriched uranium, based on binding contractual agreements for the supply of such material, plus parallel binding commitments/assurances of fuel fabrication services. It was recognized that while an actual (physical) bank of natural or low enriched uranium could be established, it would be impractical for technical and economic reasons to have an actual bank of nuclear fuel assemblies, given the different types of reactor designs and the many variants of nuclear fuel required for them – in this case, the physical bank of nuclear material would need to be supplemented by parallel binding commitments/assurances of fuel fabrication services. It was recognized that the complexity and details of such modalities requires further consideration.

What objective criteria would be required?

The discussions also touched upon the issue of objective criteria, i.e. the conditions governing eligibility for benefiting from assurance mechanisms. Different eligibility criteria have been included in the proposals discussed. Further discussion is required regarding the nature of the non-proliferation undertaking to be considered as the qualifying criterion. It was recognized that in accordance with the IAEA Statute, an Agency-administered assurance mechanism would have to be available to all Member States in a non-discriminatory manner. For any mechanism, whether or not it involves a role for the Agency, certain release criteria would need to be defined and agreed upon, either by the IAEA Board of Governors or the supply consortium. Another aspect requiring further assessment is how best to assure that the application of the release mechanism is demonstrably non-political and based on objective criteria.

Possible role(s) of the Agency?

Existing proposals envisage different roles for the Agency, and yet others can be considered. The suggested roles ranged from

Agency administration or ownership of natural or low enriched uranium stocks, to administration of virtual stocks and associated parallel fuel fabrication commitments. It was noted that the IAEA Statute was sufficiently broad to allow the Agency to establish its own stocks of nuclear fuel, purchased from, or donated by, Member States for supply to another Member State against charges determined by the Board; to facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel from one Member State to another; and also to facilitate, inter alia, the provision of enrichment and fuel fabrication services by one Member State to another or to the IAEA. It was noted further that a number of legal arrangements were needed, with variations, depending on whether title to the material concerned passes through the Agency or whether it passes directly from the Supplier State to the Recipient State. These were: (1) an arrangement between the Supplier State and the Agency; to include inter alia consent rights by the Supplier State to export the fuel, licensing and transport requirements as well as the corresponding privileges and immunities; (2) an arrangement between the Recipient State and the Agency to include inter alia the issues listed in Article XI.F of the Statute; (3) the underlying contractual arrangements with nuclear fuel providers, transporters, storage providers, etc.; and, (4) in case the IAEA were to establish an actual bank of nuclear fuel, agreements covering safeguards, security, safety and liability for nuclear damage with the State where the fuel is located as well as transit agreements with neighbouring States. While models of certain legal arrangements already exist, the details would need to be worked out.

Possible role(s) of the nuclear industry?

The discussions involved the participation of representatives of the nuclear industry and showed that different roles for the nuclear industry can be envisaged or have been proposed and that there are many technical and other issues pertaining to nuclear fuel that need further discussion and consideration. It was recognised that for a well-functioning assurance of supply mechanism, whether for nuclear fuel or for reactors, the nuclear industry would be an essential partner. In this regard, further consultations would be useful with the nuclear industry, particularly on a framework under which the nuclear industry would provide the required goods and services in support of an assurance of supply mechanism, without negative effects on the diversity and stability of the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels.

Other key issues

The discussions also showed that several other important issues concerning assurance mechanisms require further consideration. These include, for instance, issues related to sustainable financing. Other unresolved key issues are how to structure assurance mechanisms in a manner that does not result in a real or perceived division between nuclear fuel/reactor technology haves and have-nots, and does not undermine existing multilateral, treaty-based nuclear non-proliferation norms or State sovereignty/rights.

Next Steps

Based on the discussions at the Special Event, it is the sense of the Event Chairman that the issues noted above require further detailed expert examination with a view to formulating well-structured recommendations regarding the establishment of assurance of supply mechanisms.

It is also the sense of the Event Chairman that such recommendations could usefully be structured in terms of policy, legal and technical issues, and that proposals could be formulated by the IAEA Secretariat working in parallel with and drawing upon Member States, nuclear industry and other appropriate expertise. This work would naturally take into account current as well as future proposals and other relevant ideas and studies, and this work can and should be undertaken to allow consideration of these matters by the Board of Governors in 2007. It is likely that these undertakings will evolve into an agenda for near- and mid term actions. But it is important to begin.

I trust that these observations will be conveyed, along with any recommendations in this connection by the Director General, to the Agency's Board of Governors.

¹ A virtual reserve does not involve a separate physical storage of natural or low enriched uranium, but relies on its availability from

suppliers that have agreed to be a part of the fuel assurance mechanism

Executive Summary of the UK MOD/FCO White Paper on 'The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent'

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The UK is committed to helping to secure international peace and security. Since 1956, the nuclear deterrent has underpinned our ability to do so even in the most challenging circumstances. Over the last 50 years, it has been used only to deter acts of aggression against our vital interests, never to coerce others.

Why do we need to take decisions now?

At the 2005 General Election our manifesto made a commitment to retain the UK's independent nuclear deterrent. Even with an extension to their lives, the Vanguard class submarines are likely to start leaving service from the early 2020s. We estimate that it will take around 17 years to design, manufacture and commission a replacement submarine. So we need to take decisions now on whether to retain this capability in the longer term.

Why should we retain our nuclear deterrent?

The Government's primary responsibility is for the security of current and future UK citizens. The UK's security position has changed from the Cold War, and this change was reflected in the sharp reductions in the scale and readiness of our nuclear forces that were set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.

The threat has now changed – but the global context does not justify complete UK nuclear disarmament:

- significant nuclear arsenals remain, some of which are being modernised and expanded;
- the number of states possessing nuclear weapons has continued to grow, as demonstrated most recently by North Korea's attempted nuclear test in October this year.

Ballistic missile technology has also continued to proliferate and most industrialised countries have the capability to develop chemical and biological weapons.

It is not possible accurately to predict the global security environment over the next 20 to 50 years. On our current analysis, we cannot rule out the risk either that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK's vital interests will re-emerge or that new states will emerge that possess a more limited nuclear capability, but one that could pose a grave threat to our vital interests. Equally there is a risk that some countries might in future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism from their soil. We must not allow such states to threaten our national security, or to deter us and the international community from taking the action required to maintain regional and global security.

We can only deter such threats in future through the continued possession of nuclear weapons. Conventional capabilities cannot have the same deterrent effect. We therefore see an enduring role for the UK's nuclear forces as an essential part of our capability for deterring blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests by nuclear-armed opponents.

We have thus decided to take the steps necessary to sustain a credible deterrent capability in the 2020s and beyond.

How should we maintain our nuclear deterrent?

Our review of the available options has demonstrated that retaining a submarine based system provides the most effective deterrent; and that no credible alternative is cheaper. Submarines are far more difficult to detect and track and so are less vulnerable to attack than the other options. Ballistic missiles are more effective than cruise missiles because they have much greater range and payload, and are far harder to intercept.

We have therefore decided to maintain our nuclear deterrent by building a new class of submarines. Currently we require a fleet of four submarines to maintain one continuously on patrol and retaining this posture is essential to assure the invulnerability of the deterrent. We will investigate fully whether there is scope to make

sufficiently radical changes to the design of the new submarines, and their operating, manning, training and support arrangements, to enable us to maintain these continuous deterrent patrols with a fleet of only three submarines. A final decision on whether we require three or four submarines will be taken when we know more about their detailed design.

We have also decided to participate in the US life extension programme for the Trident D5 missile, which will enable us to retain that missile in-service until the early 2040s. Our existing nuclear warhead design will last into the 2020s. We do not yet have sufficient information to know whether it can, with some refurbishment, be extended beyond that point or whether we will need to develop a replacement warhead: a decision is likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.

What will this cost?

The costs of this programme will be refined as we engage in detailed discussion with industry. Our current estimate is that the procurement costs of the new submarines and associated equipment and infrastructure will be in the region of £15-20 billion (at 2006/07 prices) for a four-boat fleet. The costs will fall principally in the period between 2012 and 2027. The investment required to maintain our deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need. Decisions on the level of investments in nuclear and conventional capability will be taken in the Comprehensive Spending Review, the results of which will be announced next year. In-service costs for the deterrent over the period between 2020 and 2050 will remain broadly similar to the current position.

What are our international obligations?

Renewing our minimum nuclear deterrent capability is fully consistent with all our international obligations. It is also consistent with our continuing commitment to work towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons. We have taken a leading role in a wide range of multilateral initiatives in support of the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We have also taken significant steps to reduce our nuclear capabilities. We have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads amongst the nuclear weapon States recognised under the NPT and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system.

We have now decided that we can reduce our stockpile of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160. This will represent a 20% reduction on the figure set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, and is almost a 50% reduction compared to the plans of the previous Government.

Summary

We are committed to retaining the minimum nuclear deterrent capability necessary to provide effective deterrence, whilst setting an example where possible by reducing our nuclear capabilities, and working multilaterally for nuclear disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation. We believe this is the right balance between our commitment to a world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons and our responsibilities to protect the current and future citizens of the UK.

'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons' by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn.

[The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007]

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage – to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium – potentially to weapons grade – highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.

Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma – to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."

Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.

What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly sceptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany

and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons.

What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.

First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include:

- Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
- Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
- Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
- Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.
- Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
- Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.
- Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.
- Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of

Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer.

A World Free of Nuclear Weapons? Speech by UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Margaret Beckett

[Washington DC, 25 June 2007]

[Eds...]

Last year, Kofi Annan said – and he was right – that the world risks becoming mired in a sterile stand-off between those who care most about disarmament and those who care most about proliferation. The dangers of, what he termed, such mutually assured paralysis are dangers to us all. Weak action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our interests. And any solution must be a dual one that sees movement on both proliferation and disarmament – a revitalisation, in other words, of the grand bargain struck in 1968, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was established.

What makes this the time to break the stand-off ?

Today the non-proliferation regime is under particular pressure. We have already seen the emergence of a mixture of further declared and undeclared nuclear powers. And now, two countries – Iran and North Korea, both signatories of the NPT – stand in open defiance of the international community. Their actions have profound and direct implications for global security. Each of them also raises the serious prospect of proliferation across their region.

In the case of Iran, in particular, if the regime is trying to acquire nuclear weapons – and there are very few either in that region or outside it who seriously doubt that that is the goal – then it is raising the spectre of a huge push for proliferation in what is already one of the most unstable parts of the world.

That alone makes the debate on disarmament and non-proliferation we have to have today different in degree: it has become more immediate and more urgent.

On top of that, we must respond to other underlying trends that are putting added pressure on the original non-proliferation regime. One of those, just one, is the emergence of Al Qaeda and its offshoots – terrorists whom we know to be actively seeking nuclear materials.

Another though is the anticipated drive towards civil, nuclear power as the twin imperatives of energy security and climate security are factored into energy policy across the world. How can we ensure this does not lead to either nuclear materials or particularly potentially dangerous nuclear know-how – particularly enrichment and reprocessing technologies – being diverted for military use or just falling into the wrong hands? How do we do so without prejudice to the economic development of countries that have every right under the NPT to develop a civil, nuclear capability.

And last there are some very specific triggers for action – key impending decisions – that are fast approaching. The START treaty will expire in 2009. We will need to start thinking about how we move from a bilateral disarmament framework built by the US and Russia to one more suited to our multi-polar world.

And then in 2010 we will have the NPT Review Conference itself. By the time that is held, we need the international community to be foursquare and united behind a global non-proliferation regime. We can't afford for that conference to be a fractured or fractious one: rather we need to strengthen the NPT in all its aspects.

That may all sound quite challenging – I meant it to. But there is no reason to believe that we cannot rise to that challenge.

Let's look at some of the facts. Despite the recent log-jam, the basic non-proliferation consensus is and has been remarkably resilient. The grand bargain of the NPT has, by and large, held for the past 40 years. The vast majority of states – including many that have the technology to do so if they chose – have decided not to develop nuclear weapons. And far fewer states than was once feared have acquired and retained nuclear weapons.

Even more encouragingly, and much less well known outside this room, many more states – South Africa, Libya, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Argentina, Brazil – have given up active nuclear weapons programmes, turned back from pursuing such programmes, or – as the case of the former Soviet Union countries – chosen to hand over weapons on their territory.

And of course the Nuclear Weapons States themselves have made significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, which I will come to later.

So we have grounds for optimism; but we have none for complacency. The successes we have had in the past have not come about by accident but by applied effort. And we will need much more of the same in the months and years to come. That will mean continued momentum and consensus on non-proliferation, certainly. But, and this is my main argument today, the chances of achieving that are greatly increased if we can also point to genuine commitment and to concrete action on nuclear disarmament.

[Eds...]

Meanwhile, there is some imaginative work going on aimed at persuading states that they can have guaranteed supplies of electricity from nuclear power without the need to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies. For example, the work on fuel supply assurances following the report of the IAEA expert group; the US's own Global Nuclear Energy Partnership initiative on more proliferation-resistant technologies; and the UK's own proposal for advanced export approval of nuclear fuel that cannot subsequently be revoked – the so-called "enrichment bond".

[Eds...]

The point of doing more on disarmament, then, is not to convince the Iranians or the North Koreans. I do not believe for a second that further reductions in our nuclear weapons would have a material effect on their nuclear ambitions.

Rather the point of doing more is this: because the moderate majority of states – our natural and vital allies on non-proliferation – want us to do more. And if we do not, we risk helping Iran and North Korea in their efforts to muddy the water, to turn the blame for their own nuclear intransigence back onto us. They can undermine our arguments for strong international action in support of the NPT by painting us as doing too little too late to fulfil our own obligations.

And that need to appear consistent, incidentally, is just as true at the regional level. The international community's clear commitment to a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in successive UN resolutions has been vital in building regional support for a tough line against Iran.

So what does doing more – and indeed being seen to do more – on disarmament actually mean?

First, I think we need to be much more open about the disarmament steps we are already taking or have taken. Here in the long-standing, and perhaps understandable, culture of increased secrecy that surrounds the nuclear world we may be our own worst enemy. There is little public remembrance or recognition of the vast cuts in warheads – some 40 000 – made by the US and the former USSR since the end of the Cold War. Nor, for that matter, the cuts that France and the UK have made to our much smaller stocks. We all need to do more, much more, to address that. And I welcome the US State Department's recent moves in that direction.

But we would be kidding ourselves if we thought that this was a problem only of perception – simply of a failure to communicate, although that failure is very real. The sense of stagnation is real enough. The expiry of the remaining US-Russia arms control deals; the continued existence of large arsenals; the stalemate on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. They all point to an absence of debate at the highest levels

on disarmament and a collective inability thus far to come up with a clear, forward plan.

What we need is both vision – a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action – progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, both at the moment are too weak.

Let me start with the vision because, perhaps, that is the harder case to make. After all, we all signed up to the goal of the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons back in 1968; so what does simply restating that goal achieve today?

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Believing that the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons is possible can act as a spur for action on disarmament. Believing, at whatever level, that it is not possible, is the surest path to inaction. If there will always be nuclear weapons, what does it matter if there are 1000 or 10 000?

And just as the vision gives rise to action, conversely so does action give meaning to the vision. As that Wall Street Journal article put it, and again I quote: "Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair and urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible"

[Eds...]

... acknowledging that the conditions for disarmament do not exist today does not mean resigning ourselves to the idea that nuclear weapons can never be abolished in the future. Nor does it prevent us from taking steps to reduce numbers now and to start thinking about how we would go about reaching that eventual goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

That is why in taking the decision to retain our ability to have nuclear weapons, the UK government was very clear about four things. First that we would be open and frank with our own citizens and with our international partners about what we were doing and why. It is all being done upfront and in public – not as in the past, behind the scenes. Second that we would be very clear and upfront that when the political conditions existed, we would give up our remaining nuclear weapons. Third that we were not enhancing our nuclear capability in any way and would continue to act strictly in accordance with our NPT obligations. And fourth that we would reduce our stock of operationally available warheads by a further 20 per cent – to the very minimum we considered viable to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent.

This was our way – and I can assure you it was a difficult process – to resolve the dilemma between our genuine commitment to abolition and our considered judgement that sadly now was not the time to take a unilateral step to totally disarm.

It's the same dilemma every nuclear weapons state faces. And we can all make the same choices in recommitting to the goal of abolition and taking practical steps towards achieving that goal.

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Since we no longer live in a bipolar world, those future commitments may no longer require strict parity. They could be unilateral undertakings. Certainly the UK experience – and indeed the United States' own experience with the reduction of its tactical weapons in Europe – is that substantial reductions can be achieved through independent re-examination of what is really needed to deter: that approach has allowed the UK to reduce our operationally available warheads by nearly half over the last ten years from what was already a comparatively low base. We have also reduced the readiness of the nuclear force that remains. We now only have one boat on patrol at any one time, carrying no more than 48 warheads – and our missiles are not targeted at any specific sites.

Commitments like these need not even be enshrined in formal treaties. The UK's reductions, after all, are not. But clearly both the US and Russia will require sufficient assurance that their interests and their strategic stability will be safeguarded. Part of the solution may be provided by the extension of the most useful transparency and confidence building measures in the START framework, should the US and Russia agree to do so.

And I should make clear here again, that when it will be useful to include in any negotiations the one per cent of the world's nuclear weapons that belong to the UK, we will willingly do so.

In addition to these further reductions, we need to press on with both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and with the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Both limit – in real and practical ways – the ability of states party to develop new weapons and to expand their nuclear capabilities. And as such they therefore both play a very powerful symbolic role too – they signal to the rest of the world that the race for more and bigger weapons is over, and that the direction for now on will be down and not up. That's why we are so keen for those countries that have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT. The moratorium observed by all the nuclear weapon states is a great step forward; but by allowing the CTBT to enter into force – and, of course, US ratification would provide a great deal of impetus – we would be showing that this is a permanent decision, a permanent change and in the right direction.

At the same time, I believe that we will need to look again at how we manage global transparency and global verification. This will have to extend beyond the bilateral arrangements between Russia and the US. If we are serious about complete nuclear disarmament we should begin now to build deeper relationships on disarmament between nuclear weapon states.

For our part, the UK is ready and willing to engage with other members of the P5 on transparency and confidence building measures. Verification will be particularly key – any future verification regime for a world free of nuclear weapons will need to be tried and tested. In my opinion, it will need to place more emphasis on the warheads themselves than the current arrangement which focuses primarily on delivery systems. That will become particularly true as numbers of warheads drop.

And we have to keep doing the hard diplomatic work on the underlying political conditions – resolving the ongoing sources of tension in the world, not least in the Middle East and between Pakistan and India. We also need to build a more mature, balanced and stable relationship between ourselves and Russia.

[Eds...]

And when it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work. To be, as it were, a "disarmament laboratory".

As far as new thinking goes, the International Institute of Strategic Studies is planning an in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will participate in that study and provide funding for one of their workshops, focussing on some of the crucial technical questions in this area.

The study and subsequent workshops will offer a thorough and systematic analysis of what a commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice. What weapons and facilities will have to go before we can say that nuclear weapons are abolished? What safeguards will we have to put in place over civil nuclear facilities? How do we increase transparency and put in place a verification regime so that everyone can be confident that no-one else has or is developing nuclear weapons? And finally – and perhaps this is perhaps the greatest challenge of all – what path can we take to complete nuclear disarmament that avoids creating new instabilities themselves potentially damaging to global security.

And then we have these new areas of practical work. This will concentrate on the challenge of creating a robust, trusted and effective system of verification that does not give away national security or proliferation sensitive information.

Almost a decade ago, we asked the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment to begin developing our expertise in methods and techniques to verify the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We reported on this work throughout the last Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle. Now we intend to build on that work, looking more deeply at several key stages in the verification process – and again report our findings as soon as possible.

One area we will be looking at further is authentication – in other words confirming that an object presented for dismantlement as a

warhead is indeed a warhead. There are profound security challenges in doing that. We need to find ways to carry out that task without revealing sensitive information. At the moment we are developing technical contacts with Norway in this area. As a non-nuclear weapons state they will offer a valuable alternative perspective on our research.

Then we will be looking more closely at chain of custody issues – in other words how to provide confidence that the items that emerge from the dismantlement process have indeed come from the authenticated object that went into that process to begin with. Here we face the challenge of managing access to sensitive nuclear facilities. We have already carried out some trial inspections of facilities to draw lessons for the handling of access under any future inspections regime.

And last we intend to examine how to provide confidence that the dismantled components of a nuclear warhead are not being returned to use in new warheads. This will have to involve some form of monitored storage, with a difficult balance once again to be struck between security concerns and verification requirements. We are currently working on the design concepts for building such a monitored store, so that we can more fully investigate these complex practical issues.

The initiatives I have announced today are only small ones. But they are, I hope you will agree, in the right direction – a signal of intent and purpose to ourselves and to others. We will talk more and do more with our international partners – those who have nuclear weapons, and those who do not – in the weeks and months to come.

[Eds...]

'Toward A Nuclear-Free World' by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn

[The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008]

The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.

The steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.

One year ago, in an essay in this paper, we called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The interest, momentum and growing political space that has been created to address these issues over the past year has been extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all over the world.

Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for urgent action: "It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious."

In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating: "What we need is both a vision – a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons – and action – progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak."

We have also been encouraged by additional indications of general support for this project from other former U.S. officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors. These include: Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell.

Inspired by this reaction, in October 2007, we convened veterans of the past six administrations, along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, for a conference at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. There was general agreement about the importance of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as a guide to our thinking about nuclear policies, and about the importance of a series of steps that will pull us back from the nuclear precipice.

The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join.

Some steps are already in progress, such as the ongoing reductions in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range, or strategic, bombers and missiles. Other near-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 2008, can in and of themselves dramatically reduce nuclear dangers. They include:

- *Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991.* Much has been learned about the vital task of verification from the application of these provisions. The treaty is scheduled to expire on Dec. 5, 2009. The key provisions of this treaty, including their essential monitoring and verification requirements, should be extended, and the further reductions agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions should be completed as soon as possible.
- *Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks.* Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows in the U.S.-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.
- *Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days.* Interpreting deterrence as requiring mutual assured destruction (MAD) is an obsolete policy in today's world, with the U.S. and Russia formally having declared that they are allied against terrorism and no longer perceive each other as enemies.
- *Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit meeting.* This should include agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the U.S. from the Middle East, along with completion of work to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. Reducing tensions over missile defense will enhance the possibility of progress on the broader range of nuclear issues so essential to our security. Failure to do so will make broader nuclear cooperation much more difficult.
- *Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb.* There are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries around the world, and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The U.S., Russia and other nations that have worked with the Nunn-Lugar programs, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should play a key role in helping to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 relating to improving nuclear security – by offering teams to assist jointly any nation in meeting its obligations under this resolution to provide for appropriate, effective security of these materials.

As Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger put it in his address at our October conference, "Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?" To underline the governor's point, on Aug. 29-30, 2007, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were loaded on a U.S. Air Force plane, flown across the country and unloaded. For 36 hours, no

one knew where the warheads were, or even that they were missing.

- *Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination.* These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.
- *Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies.* More progress in this direction is urgent, and could be achieved through requiring the application of monitoring provisions (Additional Protocols) designed by the IAEA to all signatories of the NPT.
- *Adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities.* This calls for a bipartisan review, first, to examine improvements over the past decade of the international monitoring system to identify and locate explosive underground nuclear tests in violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the technical progress made over the past decade in maintaining high confidence in the reliability, safety and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear arsenal under a test ban. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is putting in place new monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests – an effort the U.S. should urgently support even prior to ratification.

In parallel with these steps by the U.S. and Russia, the dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations.

Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations, by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities. The government of Norway will sponsor a conference in February that will contribute to this process.

Another subject: Developing an international system to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the growing global interest in developing nuclear energy and the potential proliferation of nuclear enrichment capabilities, an international program should be created by advanced nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA. The purpose should be to provide for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel, reserves of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance, financing, and spent fuel management – to ensure that the means to make nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe.

There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations would become involved.

President Reagan's maxim of "trust but verify" should be reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials.

We should also build an international consensus on ways to deter or, when required, to respond to, secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements.

Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.

In some respects, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can't get there from here. But the risks from continuing to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible.

Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was

secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The following participants in the Hoover-NTI conference also endorse the view in this statement: General John Abizaid, Graham Allison, Brooke Anderson, Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Mike Armacost, Bruce Blair, Matt Bunn, Ashton Carter, Sidney Drell, General Vladimir Dvorkin, Bob Einhorn, Mark Fitzpatrick, James Goodby, Rose Gottemoeller, Tom Graham, David Hamburg, Siegfried Hecker, Tom Henriksen, David Holloway, Raymond Jeanloz, Ray Juzaitis, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, Michael McFaul, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Pavel Podvig, William Potter, Richard Rhodes, Joan Rohlfing, Harry Rowen, Scott Sagan, Roald Sagdeev, Abe Sofaer, Richard Solomon, and Philip Zelikow.

Statement on Call for World Without Nuclear Weapons

[Barack Obama, 17 January 2008]

I welcome the renewed call by Sam Nunn, George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and William Perry to urge the United States to support a world free of nuclear weapons. These four Americans have shown leadership on this issue for many months, and I have embraced this goal throughout my campaign. As I said in a speech on October 2: "Here's what I'll say as President: America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons."

I also know that words are not enough. We must act responsibly and resolutely to pursue this goal. That is what I have done in the Senate, where I've made combating the spread of nuclear weapons a top priority. I have worked with SamNunn's former co-sponsor - Richard Lugar - to pass a law to secure nuclear weapons and materials around the world. And I have worked with Chuck Hagel to introduce a law to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

As President, I will set and seek the goal of a world with no nuclear weapons. We will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But we will move forward down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons by securing all loose nuclear materials within four years; stopping the development of new nuclear weapons; working with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seeking dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and setting a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.

As America keeps its own commitment, we will also work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to trigger automatic sanctions on nations like Iran and North Korea that break the rules.

It's time for America to lead again. These four American statesmen are working across the aisle to move our nation - and our world - toward a safer and more secure future. A world without nuclear weapons is profoundly in America's interest and the world's interest. It is our responsibility to make the commitment, and to do the hard work to make this vision a reality. That's what I've done as a Senator and a candidate, and that's what I'll do as President.

Excerpts from a Speech by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown

[Chamber of Commerce, Delhi, 5 February 2008]

[Eds...]

Now the world is not properly equipped either to respond, as we must, to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We have seen the rise of non-state terrorism, the threat to civilians during conflict and from genocide, and the need to rapidly underpin peace with support for reconstruction. So it is time also to set a new and ambitious agenda to prevent conflict and to stabilise and to see reconstruction in what we have seen far too often - failed and failing states. And facing serious challenges from Iran and North Korea, we must send a powerful signal to all members of the international community that the race for more and bigger stockpiles of nuclear destruction is over. The expiry of the remaining US-Russia arms deals, the continued existence of these

large arsenals, the stalemates on a fissile material cut-off treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must all be addressed.

And let me say today Britain is prepared to use our expertise to help determine the requirements for the verifiable elimination of nuclear warheads. And I pledge that in the run-up to the Non Proliferation Treaty review conference in 2010 we will be at the forefront of the international campaign to accelerate disarmament amongst possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ultimately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons.

Around the world we are already seeing new interest in nuclear power as a source of energy supply and this increased interest in civil nuclear power also brings with it increased risk of proliferation for military purposes. So we want to press ahead for early agreement on a new IAEA-led international system to help non-nuclear states acquire the new sources of energy they need, including through an enrichment bond for uranium. And this offer that we want to make to non-nuclear states is one that we will make only in return for firm commitments to the highest non-proliferation standards. Because the threat and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is now compounded by the continuing proliferation of conventional weapons, and we know that one person is killed every minute from small arms, Britain will also work internationally to achieve a global arms trade treaty.

UN Statement by Mr Des Browne (UK Secretary of State for Defence) at Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament

[Geneva, 5 February 2008]

"Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament"

I know it is rare for a defence Minister to address a conference on disarmament. That is precisely why I wanted to come here today. I want the fact that the British Secretary of State for Defence is addressing this Conference to send a strong message about the priority we give to our disarmament commitments.

[Eds...]

As the preamble to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty makes clear, all States party to the Treaty should work towards "the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the elimination of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery..."

This is not some "get out" clause for the five recognised Nuclear Weapon States. Rather it is recognition that all signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty already have agreed to strive for measures which provide an environment for all Nuclear Weapon States to eliminate their holdings. This is a joint commitment and it is a joint responsibility.

As this Conference knows too well, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force and there is an ongoing stalemate on a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty. This hardly gives the impression that progress is being made.

I commend this Conference for playing a crucial role in moving forward the debate and seeking solutions. And I encourage all experts and representatives engaged in this process to redouble their efforts.

Solutions

It may be a truism but global challenges require global solutions. The solutions must take us all towards an increase in the pace of multilateral disarmament as well as a reduction in proliferation.

The international community needs a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament. A plan that also addresses proliferation, so that disarmament and counter-proliferation both move forward together, each supporting the other. Although, we all understand that there is no formal conditionality between progress on disarmament and non-proliferation, our goal should be a virtuous circle, where progress on one reinforces the other.

Our chances of eliminating nuclear weapons will be enhanced immeasurably if the Non-Nuclear Weapon States can see forward planning, commitment and action toward multilateral nuclear disarmament by Nuclear Weapon States. Without this, we risk generating the perception that the Nuclear Weapon States are failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations and this will be used by some states as an excuse for their nuclear intransigence.

What then should this plan comprise of?

Let me start with the question of reductions to the major nuclear arsenals.

There is little public acknowledgement of the vast cuts so far in US and Russian warheads, especially since the Cold War. Nor, for that matter, the cuts to the much smaller French and UK stocks.

I welcome the recent news by the US that, by 2012, their stockpile will be at its lowest for 50 years – less than one quarter of the level at the end of the Cold War. We all need to maintain this effort but we also need to get better at publicising the fact that we are on this path.

We must also welcome the ongoing bilateral discussions between the US and Russia for a follow-on arrangement after the current START treaty expires. Success would provide a powerful signal that the post Cold War disarmament trend towards zero will continue.

States also need to explore whether there is scope to reduce further the number of nuclear weapons they need to maintain an effective deterrent. The UK set an example by reducing our operationally available warheads by a further 20% when we decided last year to maintain our own minimum nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current Vanguard-class submarines.

The international climate must become one that gives all Nuclear Weapon States the confidence to continue to make similar changes.

I welcome the discussions on how to deal with States who may leave the NPT. Leaving any treaty is always a sovereign decision, but the NPT Review Conference in 2010 should send a message to any States considering withdrawal that such a decision will have consequences.

We must be resolute in tackling proliferation challenges. We must confront states who are looking to breach their obligations and undermine global security by developing WMD. And within the international community we must ensure there is no space for such proliferators.

The UK is committed to supporting the universal right of access to safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technology. But this cannot be at the risk of further proliferation. It is in this context that we have developed the concept of an Enrichment Bond – whereby assistance is granted in return for demonstrable commitment to non-proliferation.

We should also continue to strive for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and progress in its verification system. I warmly welcome the ratification last week by Columbia – real evidence of progress on this key piece of our security architecture. Since 1991, the UK has not tested a nuclear weapon and I call on all states to ratify the CTBT as soon as possible, especially those so-called Annex II states whose ratification is required for the Treaty's entry into force.

I believe a key milestone towards building this climate for disarmament is securing a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, which, in real ways, will limit the ability of signatory states to expand their nuclear arsenals and which will provide the necessary reassurance to their neighbours and the international community.

Since 1995, the UK has had a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes and permanently placed excess defence material under international safeguards. The US, France and Russia have announced similar formal arrangements. But we want to see that political commitment transformed into a legal one through a treaty.

In 2007, the International Community came very close to starting negotiations in 2007 and I commend all those states who were willing to take part. And I call on those three states that did not, to

do so this year. As UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, said last month, we all have legitimate national security concerns, but without any preconditions, let's at least get to negotiations of a Treaty, where these security concerns can then be addressed.

Some commentators have raised the idea of taking the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty out of the Conference and negotiating a treaty amongst a smaller group of like-minded nations. Frankly this misses the very point of the Conference – it is the only body where all nuclear armed States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States sit together to discuss security issues of the highest sensitivity.

Safeguarding fissile material is a crucial responsibility of those who possess nuclear weapons. So let us work together within this Conference to make real multilateral progress.

But just as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is a high priority for the UK, I acknowledge other nations have other priorities, such as negotiating a new legal instrument on preventing an arms race in space.

At the UN, the UK consistently has supported the annual resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. But there is no international consensus on the need to start negotiations on a new international legal instrument governing the military use of space. So rather than allowing this stalemate to continue, efforts should instead be focused on areas such as transparency and confidence building to allow us all to move forward.

UK / Defence Contribution

So what is the UK, and more specifically the Ministry of Defence, doing to help move this agenda along, and to help create an environment conducive to multilateral nuclear disarmament?

Already we have contributed in the most tangible way through reducing the number of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160. This has now been achieved. And if we are able to reduce further, we will do that.

With a contribution from the UK government, the International Institute for Strategic Studies is examining the political and technical requirements for a world free from nuclear weapons. And I look forward to the final report, which will be published later this year.

However, one area on which I would like to focus is our work on verification of nuclear disarmament.

Just as Margaret Beckett said last year, I too want the UK to be seen as a 'disarmament laboratory'. By that I mean the UK becoming a role model and testing ground for measures that we and others can take on key aspects of disarmament. In particular, measures needed to determine the requirements for the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.

Any verification regime will have to be robust, effective and mutually trusted and, crucially, one that doesn't give away national security or proliferation-sensitive information.

The more reductions states make, the more confidence they will require that no one is cheating and secretly retaining a "marginal nuclear weapon". It is therefore of paramount importance that verification techniques are developed which enable us all – Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States – to have confidence that when a state says it has fully and irrevocably dismantled a nuclear warhead, we all can be assured it is telling the truth.

The UK is ready to lead the way on this. Research into how one technically verifies the dismantlement of a warhead continues at the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston.

Developing such techniques will take time but it is very important it is not undertaken in 'splendid isolation'. It must be built on the requirements of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States alike. We need to consider not only what information we are willing to divulge but also what information a Non-Nuclear Weapon State will want to receive.

With this in mind, over the last year AWE has developed a technical cooperation initiative with several Norwegian defence laboratories. The process of engaging with Norway must avoid breaching our mutual NPT obligations, which in itself serves as

useful insight into how future multilateral discussions might proceed.

The difficulty is in developing technologies which strike the right balance between protecting security and proliferation considerations and, at the same time, providing sufficient international access and verification. But this is a challenge we can overcome.

If we are serious about doing our bit to create the conditions for complete nuclear disarmament, we must now also begin to build deeper technical relationships on disarmament between nuclear weapon states.

So I come to this Conference with a proposal.

As a next step, and following on from the AWE research, the UK is willing to host a technical conference of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. We hope such a conference will enable the five recognised nuclear weapons states to reinforce a process of mutual confidence building: working together to solve some of these difficult technical issues.

As part of our global efforts, we also hope to engage with other P5 states in other confidence-building measures on nuclear disarmament throughout this NPT Review Cycle. The aim here is to promote greater trust and confidence as a catalyst for further reductions in warheads - but without undermining the credibility of our existing nuclear deterrents.

[Eds...]

Transcript of Remarks by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament

[Geneva, 12 February 2008]

[Eds...]

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a pivotal element of the modern international security system. Here, in Geneva, a second session of the Preparatory Committee for a regular review of the NPT will be held in a few months' time. We are interested in as constructive and efficient as possible work of this forum, which is called upon to create favourable conditions for a successful 2010 Review Conference. The important thing is to ensure further effectiveness of the Treaty proceeding from the unity of its three fundamental elements: non-proliferation, peaceful uses of atomic energy and disarmament.

Russian-American relations in the area of limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms are of key importance to real disarmament. Unfortunately, there is no certainty about the future of this process. The SALT I Treaty expires in December 2009. Long in advance, as far back as three years ago, we offered the idea of developing and concluding a new full-fledged agreement on further and verifiable reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

Our goal is to preserve stability and predictability in strategic relations between Russia and the United States. Therefore, we suggest that all the best elements of the existing Treaty be borrowed and placed in the foundation of a new agreement. Such a document, which should, of course, be legally binding, could provide for new, lower ceilings subject to verification on both strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), and their warheads. However, it has so far been impossible to arrive at acceptable solutions.

[Eds...]

I wish to note specifically that we cannot but feel concerned over the situation where, with the looming prospect of expiration of the treaty limitations on strategic offensive arms, there are increasing efforts by the United States to deploy its global ABM system. It is well known that there is inseparable relationship between strategic offensive and defensive armaments, and it is impossible not to take that fact in account in future military planning. The desire to acquire an anti-missile "shield" while dismantling the "sheath", where the nuclear "sword" is kept is extremely dangerous. And if one also

places on the balance pan the "global lightning strike" concept providing for striking with nuclear and conventional strategic means targets in any point of the Globe in a matter of an hour after a relevant decision has been made, the risks for strategic stability and predictability become more than obvious.

We think that strategic stability can no longer remain an exclusive domain of Russian-US relations. This residual bipolarity needs to be overcome through opening up this sphere to all interested states prepared to actively cooperate with a view to strengthening common security. It is our strong belief that such cooperation should be based on equality, mutual respect, a constructive dialogue, joint analysis and due account of the interests of all the sides in working out and making decisions.

It is these principles that Russia will continue to uphold in its foreign policy. The same principles traditionally underlie the work of the Conference on Disarmament which is a unique and indispensable international negotiating forum possessing a solid intellectual and professional potential. The Conference has made a substantial contribution to strengthening peace and security, as well as promoting disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery through developing most important international legal instruments in this area.

[Eds...]

Speaking last year in Munich, President Vladimir V. Putin, warned against the emergence of new high-tech destabilizing types of weapons and new areas of confrontation, particularly in outer space. He emphasized that militarization of outer space could trigger unpredictable consequences for the international community - no less serious than the onset of the nuclear era. The President also noted that a draft special treaty was being prepared aimed at preventing such a development. The document was developed by us jointly with the People's Republic of China and circulated unofficially among interested delegations at the Conference last June. The overwhelming majority of our partners reacted positively to the document. Many states are looking forward to substantive work on this issue.

Today, the Russian Federation together with the People's Republic of China, are officially submitting a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the Conference on Disarmament for consideration. Given its mandate, agenda and high expert potential on military space issues, we believe that the Conference is the most appropriate forum for multilateral work on the draft treaty.

The draft takes into account the proposals made by Member States of the Conference in the course of their joint work on the Treaty elements that were submitted earlier to the CD by Russia and China together with a group of co-sponsors and fruitfully discussed here over more than five years.

We are submitting the draft Treaty with a research mandate. It has been supported by the majority of Member States of the Conference and does not add any complications to achieving a compromise on the programme of work of the Conference. We hope that subsequently, when appropriate conditions are there, our work can be channeled into a negotiating format with establishment of a relevant ad hoc committee of the Conference.

Modern international space law does not prohibit deployment in space of weapons which do not belong to WMD. However, such weapons, if deployed in space, would have a global reach, high employment readiness and a capability for hidden engagement of space objects and rendering them inoperative. In contrast to WMD, such weapons would be fit for real use, generate suspicion and tensions among states and frustrate the climate of mutual trust and cooperation in space exploration, rather than being a means of containment.

Apart from this, weapons deployment in space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction. And this, in turn, is fraught with a new spiral in the arms race both in space and on the earth.

The draft PPWT prohibits the deployment of weapons of any kind in space, and the use or threat of force against space objects. The Treaty is to eliminate existing lacunas in international space law, create conditions for further exploration and use of space, preserve

costly space property, and strengthen general security and arms control.

The task of preventing an arms race in space is on the Conference's agenda. It's time, by way of preempting, to start serious practical work in this field. Otherwise, we can miss the opportunity. Indeed, to prevent a threat is always easier than to remove it.

Let us not forget that the nuclear arms race was started with a view to preserving the monopoly to this type of weapons, but this monopoly was to last only four years. However, that spell was sufficient to channel the world politics along the "Cold War lines", which lasted for over four decades and resulted in a gigantic waste of material and other resources at the expense of finding solutions to the problem of development. Is it worthwhile "to repeat the history"?

All states have an equal and inalienable right to accessing space, its exploration and uses. It is logical that the problem of ensuring security in space is a common one for all of us, and we should find jointly such a solution to it as would work for strengthening international security and stability. We have no doubts that the PPWT is an effective and, at the same time, a realistic way to achieve that goal. We are prepared to closely cooperate with all Member States of the Conference.

There is another pressing issue that affects considerably strategic stability and international security and is linked to missile proliferation. In October 2007, President Vladimir V. Putin launched an initiative for rendering global the obligations set forth in the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty).

The initiative was supported by our American partners. Our common position on the matter was reflected in the Joint Statement on the INF Treaty circulated as an official paper at the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. The majority of the international community members welcomed it. However, there are States that were not prepared to support the initiative for various reasons. We take note of their approaches and would like to continue searching jointly for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem.

To this end, we propose that a new multilateral agreement based on the relevant provisions of the existing INF Treaty be elaborated and concluded. Such an international legal arrangement could comprise the following basic elements.

Firstly, the obligation of the parties not to conduct flight testing and not to manufacture medium- and shorter-range missiles or their stages and launchers.

Secondly, the undertaking by states parties to eliminate, by an agreed deadline, all their medium- and shorter-range missiles, launchers thereof and associated supporting facilities and equipment.

Thirdly, the arrangement should set rules for counting and defining the types of medium- and shorter-range missiles, their deployment and movement, in the process of getting them ready for elimination, procedures for their elimination and compliance verification.

We will circulate unofficially the elements of the proposed Agreement for study by Member States of the Conference on Disarmament. We are open for a constructive dialogue and invite our partners to join us in this work.

[Eds...]

“Basic elements of an international legally-binding arrangement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range (ground-launched) missiles, open for broad international accession”

Preamble

The States Parties to this Arrangement,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability both globally and regionally,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Arrangement will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General Obligations

1. Each State Party to this Arrangement upon entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter shall not produce or flight-test any intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, as well as all support structures and equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, being in its possession or ownership, or being located in any site under its jurisdiction or control, under categories subject to an agreement, so that no later than the agreed date after entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support structures and equipment shall be possessed by each State Party.

Article II

Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Provisions for rules of accounting and definitions of types of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are subject to an agreement.

Article III

Limitations on Stationing and Transit of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Provisions for stationing and transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are subject to an agreement.

Article IV

Exchange of Information Related to the Obligations

Provisions for exchange of an information under categories of data, related to the obligations provided for by this Arrangement, are subject to an agreement.

Article V

Elimination Procedures

Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures which are subject to an agreement.

Article VI

Rules of Compliance Verification

Provisions for rules of compliance verification are subject to an agreement.

Article VII

Definitions

Definitions of the terms "ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)", "cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)", "GLBM launcher", "GLCM launcher", "intermediate-range missile", "shorter-range missile" and others may be based on the definitions set forth in Article II of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and are subject to an agreement.

Article VIII**The Organization for Implementation of the Arrangement**

The States Parties to this Arrangement shall come to an agreement about mechanism of implementation of the subject and the objective of this Arrangement.

Article IX**Duration of the Arrangement**

This Arrangement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article X**Amendments, Signature, Accession, Ratification, Entry into Force, Reservations, Depositary, Authentic Texts**

Provisions for amendments, signature, accession, ratification, entry into force, reservations, depositary, authentic texts are subject to an agreement.

Press Release on the Statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

[13 February 2008]

On February 12 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, in his statement at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, set out the principled approaches of Russia on the topical problems of disarmament, arms control and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the draft prepared by Russia and China of a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects (PPWT) was formally submitted. The idea of developing that document had been suggested by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in Munich in February 2007.

The draft's submission was the result of the long-running work begun by Russia and China back in 2002, when the two countries came up with a working CD document containing basic elements of that treaty. In subsequent years military space problems became the subject of multilateral discussion in Geneva and in the UN General Assembly in New York.

The draft sets forth the following obligations of states parties: not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects. Such a legally binding international instrument could become a reliable guarantee that outer space will never be turned into a sphere of military confrontation. It would create a firm basis for ensuring the security of space vehicles and the safety of the expensive orbital property of states.

The idea of joint preparation of a PPWT has found broad support in the international community and the submission of the draft is a significant step on the road towards its realization.

The Russian Foreign Minister in his statement also dwelt upon the proposal advanced by President Putin in October 2007 to impart a global character to the obligations set forth in the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Russia's proposal stems from the danger of the proliferation of missile weapons of these two classes and from the desire to put up a barrier to such a development of events. At the 62nd UNGA session, this proposal was backed up by the United States of America and an overwhelming majority of states. Sergey Lavrov called for continuation of the work in this direction.

The statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament summed up a number of Russian foreign policy initiatives that have become major events of international life.

The full text of the statement of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is published on the Russian MFA's website.

Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects

[13 February 2008]

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming that outer space plays an ever-increasing role in the future development of humankind,

Emphasizing the rights to explore and use outer space freely for peaceful purposes,

Interested in keeping outer space from turning into an arena for military confrontation, in assuring security in outer space and safe functioning of space objects,

Recognizing that prevention of the placement of weapons and of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security,

Desiring to keep outer space as a sphere where no weapon of any kind is placed,

Noting that the existing agreements on arms control and disarmament relevant to outer space, including the bilateral ones, and the existing legal regimes concerning the use of outer space play a positive role in exploration of outer space and in regulating outer space activities, and should be strictly complied with; although they are unable to effectively prevent the placement of weapons and an arms race in outer space,

Recalling the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", where, inter alia, a conviction was expressed in the need for examination of further measures in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Have agreed on the following:

Article I

For the purpose of this Treaty:

a) the term "outer space" means space beyond the elevation of approximately 100 km above ocean level of the Earth;

b) the term "outer space object" means any device, designed for functioning in outer space, being launched into an orbit around any celestial body, or being in the orbit around any celestial body, or on any celestial body except the Earth, or leaving the orbit around any celestial body towards this celestial body, or moving from any celestial body towards another celestial body, or placed in outer space by any other means;

c) the term "weapons in outer space" means any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in its air, as well as to eliminate population, components of biosphere critical to human existence or inflict damage to them;

d) a weapon will be considered as "placed" in outer space if it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before leaving this orbit, or is stationed on a permanent basis somewhere in outer space;

e) the "use of force" or "threat of force" mean any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, those aimed at their destruction, damage, temporarily or permanently injuring normal functioning, deliberate alteration of the parameters of their orbit, or the threat of these actions.

Article II

States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; not to assist or encourage other states, groups of states or international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by the Treaty.

Article III

Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to prevent any activity prohibited by the Treaty on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.

Article IV

Nothing in this Treaty can be interpreted as impeding the rights of the States Parties to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law, which include but are not limited to the Charter of the United Nations and the Outer Space Treaty.

Article V

Nothing in this Treaty can be construed as impeding the realization by the States Parties of the sovereign right for self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VI

With a view to facilitate assurance of compliance with the Treaty provisions and to promote transparency and confidence-building in outer space activities the States Parties shall practice on a voluntary basis, unless agreed otherwise, agreed confidence-building measures.

Measures of verification of compliance with the Treaty may be the subject of an additional protocol.

Article VII

When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the application or the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall first consult together with a view to settling the dispute by negotiation and cooperation.

When the parties concerned do not come to an agreement after consultation, the disputed situation that has arisen may be referred to the Executive organization of the Treaty along with provision of the relevant argumentation.

Each State Party shall undertake to cooperate in the settlement of the disputed situation that has arisen with the Executive organization of the Treaty.

Article VIII

To promote the implementation of the objectives and the provisions of the Treaty, States Parties shall establish the Executive organization of the Treaty which shall:

- a) receive for consideration inquiries by any State Party or a group of States Parties related to the grounds that have arisen to believe that the violation of the Treaty by any State Party is taking place;
- b) consider matters concerning the compliance with the obligations taken by States Parties;
- c) organize and conduct consultations with the State Parties with the view to settle down the situation that has arisen in connection with the violation of a State Party of the Treaty;
- d) take measures to put an end to the violation of the Treaty by any State Party.

The title, status, specific functions and forms of work of the Executive organization of the Treaty shall be the subject of an additional protocol to the Treaty.

Article IX

International intergovernmental organizations may take part in the Treaty. Provisions defining variants and modalities of their participation in the Treaty shall be the subject of an additional protocol to the Treaty.

Article X

Any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. Upon the request of at least one third of the States Parties, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference to which all States Parties shall be invited to consider the proposed amendment.

Any amendment to the Treaty shall be approved by a majority of the votes of the States Parties. The amendment shall enter into

force for all the States Parties in accordance with the procedures of the entry into force of the Treaty.

Article XI

The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall notify the Depository in written form of the decision taken six months in advance of the withdrawal from the Treaty.

Article XII

The Treaty shall be opened for signature by all States at the United Nations headquarters in New York. Any State which did not sign the Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time.

The Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their constitutional norms. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the Depository of the Treaty.

Article XIII

The Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty States, including all Permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

Article XIV

The Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to all signatory and acceding States.

Excerpts from 'Reviving Nuclear Disarmament'

[Speech by Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of IAEA at Conference on "Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons", Oslo, 26 February 2008]

[Eds...]

In 1986, President Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev came tantalisingly close to agreeing to scrap their entire nuclear weapon arsenals. The official transcripts of their summit meetings in Reykjavik, make breathtaking reading. From the perspective of 2008, the sheer boldness of the proposals is almost unimaginable. Our keynote speaker Secretary Shultz had a front-row seat at that time. Unfortunately, the two leaders were unable to deliver the "zero option" as differences proved intractable. But in 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev did agree to abolish an entire class of nuclear weapons - shorter- and intermediate-range missiles - in the INF Treaty.

They also created a legacy of dialogue, trust and verification. Significant cuts were subsequently agreed by the two opposing power blocs in everything from military manpower, tanks and warplanes to attack helicopters. There were also verified reductions in strategic nuclear weapons in the START process. Unfortunately, the momentum got lost. The world changed. But the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of all war.

In recent years, nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. The number of states known to have nuclear weapons has expanded to nine. Virtually all are extending or modernizing their nuclear weapon arsenals. Others have tried to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear materials have become more difficult to control. A new phenomenon of illicit trade in nuclear technology has emerged. Energy security and climate change are driving many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. But the growing interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - seen by some countries as an

implicit deterrence or insurance policy - raises the prospect of a steadily increasing number of nuclear-weapon-capable states.

Roughly 27 000 nuclear warheads still remain in the arsenals of these nine countries, 95 percent of which are in the hands of the United States and the Russian Federation. Strategic reliance on these weapons by these countries and their allies undoubtedly motivates others to do the same. And naturally, plans to replenish and modernize these weapons create a pervasive feeling of cynicism among many states - which sense a "do as I say, not as I do" posture. Some of them question the compliance by the weapons states with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires parties to pursue negotiations in good faith "on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

In 1996, the International Court of Justice unanimously interpreted this as an "obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects." Security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials is also a constant concern. After all, out of 27 000 warheads and many tons of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, what are the chances that some weapons or material might go astray? In the past year alone, we have heard alarming stories about aircraft armed with nuclear missiles going missing and of nuclear facilities and equipment protected by little more than bicycle locks.

Today's keynote speaker George Shultz and his distinguished colleagues Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger and William Perry - the Four Horsemen, as I have heard them called - deserve great credit for their landmark op-ed a year ago calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. They followed up last month with another hard-hitting piece with the backing of a blue-chip list of supporters - the list reads like a "Who's Who?" of the U.S. security and foreign policy establishment of the last 50 years. I am hopeful that their work - capping the efforts of many others in the past - will now trigger a revival of nuclear disarmament.

Quick Action Possible

I echo almost everything Secretary Shultz and his colleagues say about creating a nuclear-free world. I would like, however, to provide a different perspective on a couple of points.

First, their call for "agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the U.S. from the Middle East." This, in my view, would not necessarily lead to a viable solution. It is tantamount to building a wall around this deeply troubled region, which I am sure could be punctured in different ways, particularly in our increasingly globalised world.

What the rest of the world should actually concentrate on is reaching out to the Middle East by helping to address the dire conditions in the region - chronic and festering conflicts, poverty and social injustice, repression and inept governance. These very conditions are at the root of the pervasive sense of injustice and humiliation that translates into extremism and violence, the drivers for most of the world's major non-proliferation and security concerns. We should not, therefore, quarantine the region but instead make a serious effort to integrate it. What we need is a security structure that is inclusive and not based on "us" versus "them," the very mindset we are trying here to change.

Second, the authors say the creation of a reliable system of supply of nuclear fuel should be done "by advanced nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA." Control of the nuclear fuel cycle is key to curbing proliferation risks. But it must be unambiguously under multinational control, not just managed by the leading nuclear powers. Otherwise it would fail to win the confidence of countries on the receiving end, who would perceive it as yet again perpetuating a nuclear order of "haves and have-nots." I will come back to this point shortly.

I trust that all of us in this room share the hope that we will see a world free of nuclear weapons. I also expect we are all realistic enough to accept that this will not happen overnight and will be a long-term process. But it is not an impossible dream. So what practical steps could we take now to curb proliferation and move towards disarmament?

It is clear that the nuclear-weapon-states should lead by example. They should also understand the symbiotic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Neither will function without the

other. The United States and Russia have a special responsibility. As holders of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, their actions would help to shape the actions of others. Their continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of their security sends the wrong message. At the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the weapon states gave an *unequivocal undertaking* "to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." I will highlight a few measures which I believe are do-able in the short term but would nonetheless have a significant impact.

The first step should be significant *reductions in nuclear arsenals*.

There is no reason why the two largest nuclear-weapon-states cannot slash the number of warheads they hold, without diminishing their security or that of their allies. Russia and the United States have already reduced their stockpiles dramatically, but much more needs to be done. In December, President Bush approved a significant cut in the deployed U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile, which will make it less than a quarter of its size at the end of the Cold War. But there is considerable scope for further radical reductions of deployed weapons and the elimination of undeployed ones. And as the process moves forward, other states possessing nuclear weapons should follow suit.

Second, the *operational status of nuclear weapons systems needs to be changed*.

There is no reason for nuclear weapons to be on permanent high alert - ready to be launched at perhaps 30 minutes' notice. The risk of accident or miscalculation would be dramatically lowered if weapons were taken off the Cold War hair-trigger alert. As Sam Nunn and his colleagues stated last month: "Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's environment." They go on to propose that Russia and the U.S. should introduce "mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence" - an idea which is long overdue.

Third, *multilateral disarmament negotiations must be resumed without further delay*.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must be implemented and work should be resumed on a verifiable Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The CTBT - signed more than a decade ago and seen by some as the longest sought, hardest fought arms control agreement - must be brought into force as soon as possible. And pending the early start of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty, there should be a universal moratorium on the production of fissile material.

Fourth, we must *develop a new framework for the utilisation of nuclear energy*. As I continue to advocate, a multilateral approach would ensure security of supply of nuclear fuel, while reducing the risk of proliferation. A number of proposals have been made, including a fuel bank under IAEA auspices and multinational enrichment facilities. The ultimate goal, in my view, should be to bring the entire fuel cycle, including waste disposal, under multinational control, so that no one country has the exclusive capability to produce the material for nuclear weapons. I do not believe that any country will give up its right to engage in fuel cycle activities unless the multinational framework is based on equal rights and obligations for all participants.

Fifth, we need to *improve the security of nuclear materials*. The Agency aims to track all illicit activities such as smuggling, theft and loss of nuclear and radioactive materials. It is quite alarming that a large percentage of the materials reported as lost or stolen are never recovered; and, conversely, that a large percentage of materials which are recovered have not been previously reported as missing. There continue to be many gaps in the current security system which make it vulnerable to abuse by organised crime, or worse - by extremists. This is actually the greatest danger we face - that nuclear weapons or material could fall into the wrong hands. If this were to happen, the weapon or material would almost certainly be used, since the concept of deterrence that operates between States is irrelevant to an extremist ideology.

Sixth, we must *strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA*.

International verification will be a vital part of any disarmament effort and the Agency, with its credibility and technical expertise, should be expected to play an important role in that process. Experience has shown that when the IAEA is equipped with the necessary legal authority, state-of-the-art technology and adequate financial and human resources, it is in a position to draw credible conclusions about compliance by states with their non-proliferation obligations.

The Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements, adopted in 1997 in the aftermath of the Iraq debacle when the Agency missed Iraq's clandestine 1980s nuclear programme, gives us better access to information and locations. Regrettably, this mechanism is in force in less than half the countries party to the NPT. In fact, we have more than 30 NPT member countries that have not even concluded a safeguards agreement - and for which we cannot perform any verification activities.

I regret to report that the Agency's funding is also becoming untenable. Demand for our services is constantly expanding, without corresponding increases in funding. We urgently need sufficient resources to fulfil our mandate effectively, credibly and independently. That includes giving the Agency the resources to gain access to top-quality satellite imagery and to develop new state-of-the-art verification laboratories and equipment, among other requirements.

Drivers for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

The measures I have outlined would undoubtedly help to make the world a safer place. But in order to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the long term, we should take a hard look at the reasons why countries are tempted to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Whether the reason is insecurity - the need to acquire a shield or insurance policy - or the desire to seek stature, prestige, or dominance, we need to re-visit our collective security system to address these various drivers. This means engaging in negotiations to re-engineer our global security architecture.

In that structure, the inextricable linkage between different aspects of insecurity must be recognised. If a fraction of the more than one trillion dollars presently being poured into military spending were to be spent on basic needs and good governance in the troubled parts of the world, we could do much to address the hopelessness and sense of injustice which fuel violence and extremism. The prospects for progress in preventing nuclear catastrophe will remain grim unless we begin working on such a structure: a structure in which no country relies on nuclear weapons for its security and in which we have an effective system to deter and respond to possible violations of a nuclear weapons prohibition. And, importantly, a structure in which there is an effective mechanism for resolving conflicts through peaceful means. We must engage in a sustained effort to resolve conflicts that have plagued us for generations, such as the Palestinian issue and the Korean conflict.

We are at a crucial juncture. The system is faltering. We need to bolster the non-proliferation regime and to move on nuclear disarmament. Our approach to arms control and disarmament must be rule-based. An effective arms control regime must be universal, equitable and robust. As I have argued for some time, we must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction, yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for their security. Ultimately, the prohibition of nuclear weapons should be a peremptory norm of international law, which is not treaty-dependent, similar to the prohibition of genocide, torture and slavery.

[Eds...]

Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic

[Cherbourg, 21 March 2008]

[eds...]

I am very proud to be here with you in Cherbourg to salute all those who built *Le Terrible*, the fourth and latest addition to our strategic fleet. Right here, in 1967, General de Gaulle came to pay tribute to those who had built *Le Redoutable*. Like your predecessors, you

may take pride in this submarine—a symbol of France's high technology and resolve to remain master of its destiny. Very few countries in the world have the ability to realize such an industrial and technological achievement. It took decades of effort to master such know-how, which some of our partners have neglected and thus have difficulty replicating.

[eds...]

Today we must all be mindful of the fact that the nuclear missiles of even distant powers can reach Europe in less than half an hour. Currently only the great powers have such means. But other countries, in Asia and the Middle East, are vigorously developing ballistic capabilities.

I am thinking in particular of Iran. Iran is increasing the range of its missiles, while grave suspicions surround its nuclear program. It is indeed Europe's security that is at stake.

In the face of proliferation, the international community must remain united and resolute. Because we want peace, we must show no weakness to those who violate international norms. But all those who respect them are entitled to fair access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

But we must also be prepared to confront other risks beside proliferation. The imagination of our potential aggressors is boundless when it comes to exploiting the vulnerabilities of Western societies. And tomorrow, technological breakthroughs may create new threats.

That is why we are so attached to our nuclear deterrent. It is strictly defensive. The use of nuclear weapons would clearly be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of legitimate defense, a right enshrined in the UN Charter.

Our nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a state—wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take. Our vital interests, of course, include the elements that constitute our identity and our existence as a nation-state, as well as the free exercise of our sovereignty. My responsibility, as Head of State, is to assess their limit at all times, for in a changing world, they cannot remain static.

All those who would threaten our vital interests would expose themselves to severe retaliation by France resulting in damages unacceptable to them, out of proportion with their objectives. Their centers of political, economic and military power would be targeted on a priority basis.

It cannot be ruled out that an adversary might miscalculate the delimitation of our vital interests or our determination to safeguard them. In the framework of nuclear deterrence, it would be possible, in that event, to send a nuclear warning that would underscore our resolve. That would be aimed at re-establishing deterrence.

In order for deterrence to be credible, the Head of State must have a wide range of options to face threats. Our nuclear forces have been, and will continue to be, adapted in consequence. The M51 intercontinental missile, which *Le Terrible* will carry as soon as it is commissioned in 2010, and the ASMPA missile, which Rafale will carry starting this year, fit with our risk assessment during the period covered by the White Paper.

I am also strongly convinced that it is essential to maintain two nuclear components, one sea-based and the other air-based. Indeed, their respective characteristics, notably in terms of range and precision, make them complementary. The Head of State must be able to count on them at all times in order to respond to any surprise.

In order to preserve our freedom of action, missile defense capabilities against a limited strike could be a useful complement to nuclear deterrence, without being a substitute for it. Let us not lose sight of the fact that missile defense will never be efficient enough to protect our vital interests. On this issue, France has chosen a pragmatic approach. It is in this spirit that we are taking part in the collective work of the Atlantic Alliance—dear Hervé Morin. We have solid technical know-how in this area that could be taken advantage of when the time comes.

Guaranteeing national security is expensive. Each year, their nuclear deterrent costs the French half the budget for justice or transportation. This cost must of course be controlled as much as

possible, in the financial context I just mentioned. But I am determined to assume it. It is neither a matter of prestige nor a question of rank, it is quite simply the nation's life insurance policy.

Our deterrence also takes into account changes in the world, in our alliances and in European construction.

Together with the United Kingdom, we have taken a major decision: It is our assessment that there can be no situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.

As for the Atlantic Alliance, its security is also based on nuclear deterrence. British and French nuclear forces contribute to it. This has been part of NATO's Strategic Concept since 1974 and it remains relevant today. I say to our allies: France is and will remain true to its commitments under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

As for Europe, it is a fact: By their very existence, French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe's security. Any aggressor who might consider challenging it must be mindful of this.

Let us, together, draw every logical consequence of this situation. I propose to engage those European partners who would so wish in an open dialogue on the role of deterrence and its contribution to our common security.

Our commitment to the security of our European partners is the natural expression of our ever-closer union. The Lisbon Treaty marks a historic step forward in this regard.

I would now like to address disarmament. It is a subject I would like to discuss with realism and clear-sightedness. When international security improves, France draws the consequences. It did so with the end of the Cold War.

Rather than making speeches and promises that are not translated into deeds, France acts. We respect our international commitments, and notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. France has an exemplary record, unique in the world, with respect to nuclear disarmament. France was the first State, with the United Kingdom, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the first State to decide to shut down and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes; the only State to have transparently dismantled its nuclear testing facility in the Pacific; the only State to have dismantled its ground-launched nuclear missiles; the only State to have voluntarily reduced the number of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines by a third.

France has never engaged in the arms race. France never manufactured all the types of weapons that it was technologically capable of designing. France applies a principle of strict sufficiency: It maintains its arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context. I am dedicated to this principle. As soon as I assumed my duties, I asked for this strict sufficiency to be reassessed.

This has led me to decide on a new measure of disarmament. With respect to the airborne component, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft will be reduced by one-third.

I have also decided that France could and should be more transparent with respect to its nuclear arsenal than anyone ever has been.

After this reduction, I can tell you that our arsenal will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half of the maximum number of warheads we had during the Cold War.

In giving this information, France is completely transparent because it has no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile.

Furthermore, I can confirm that none of our weapons are targeted against anyone.

Finally, I have decided to invite international experts to observe the dismantlement of our Pierrelatte and Marcoule military fissile material production facilities.

But let us not be naïve; the very basis of collective security and disarmament is reciprocity.

Today, eight nations in the world have declared they have conducted nuclear tests. I am proposing to the international community an action plan to which I call on the nuclear powers to resolutely commit by the 2010 NPT Conference.

Thus I invite all countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, beginning with China and the United States, who signed it in 1996. It is time for it to be ratified.

I urge the nuclear powers to dismantle all their nuclear testing sites in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;

I call for the immediate launching of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, and to establish without delay a moratorium on the production of such materials;

I invite the five nuclear weapon States recognized by the NPT to agree on transparency measures;

I propose opening negotiations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles;

I ask all nations to accede to and implement the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, as France has done.

At the same time, the entire international community must mobilize in all other fields of disarmament. Here too, France will make its contribution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have come to address a simple message to the Nation: Its security will be assured against the threats in the world, and France will play its full role to defend peace and its values. France's ambition must be worthy of its history.

This requires being clear-minded about strategic realities and choices.

It requires having the courage to take the necessary decisions. You can count on me to do so.

Above all, it requires being clear and firm on the essentials. And the essential is safeguarding the vital interests of France.

Here in Cherbourg, I guarantee you: France will not lower its guard.

Thank you.

**Statement by the Delegations of China, France,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America.
Delivered by UK Ambassador John Duncan to
the 2008 NPT PrepCom**

[Geneva, 9 May 2008]

1. The delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm the strong and continuing support of our countries for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the occasion of the second Preparatory Committee of the eighth NPT review cycle.

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The NPT has served the global community well over the last four decades. It remains a key instrument for collective security and the bedrock on which the international architecture to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons is built. We wish to see the NPT thrive and therefore affirm our unequivocal commitment to strengthening the Treaty and to a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference. We welcome the constructive and substantive discussion that has taken place at this year's Preparatory Committee meeting and will work to reinforce the positive dynamic that has been established.

3. We wish to address the proliferation challenges through Treaty-based multilateralism and through partnerships and relevant initiatives in which we all participate. The NPT's central role in promoting security for all depends on concerted action by all States Party to ensure compliance and respond quickly and effectively to non-compliance. We attach great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT and call on those countries remaining

outside to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States.

4. We stress the importance of the IAEA Safeguards system, which should be adequately funded. We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards, as provided for in Article III, and to the Additional Protocol and urge the ratification and implementation of these agreements. We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, and are ready to offer necessary support.

5. We reaffirm that all States Party must ensure strict compliance with their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. The proliferation of nuclear weapons undermines the security of all nations, imperils prospects for progress on other important NPT goals such as nuclear disarmament, and hurts prospects for expanding international nuclear co-operation. The proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme continue to be a matter of ongoing serious concern to us. We recall that the United Nations Security Council recently sent for the third time a strong message of international resolve to Iran by adopting sanctions resolution 1803 on Iran's nuclear programme under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as part of a dual-track strategy. We call for Iran to respond to the concerns of the international community through prompt and full implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA. We are fully behind the E3+3 process to resolve this issue innovatively through negotiations on the basis of the offer agreed in London on 2 May 2008. We also restate our support for the Six-Party Talks process moving towards the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, urge the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and call on the relevant Six-Party members to continue their cooperation through the full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. We confirm our determination to achieve satisfactory resolution of these dossiers through dialogue and negotiation.

6. We reiterate our enduring commitment to the fulfilment of our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and note that these obligations apply to all NPT States Party. We note the unprecedented progress made by Nuclear Weapon States since the end of the Cold War in the field of nuclear disarmament, which has enhanced global security and advanced the goals of the NPT. Our individual contributions to systematic and progressive efforts in nuclear disarmament, including the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in the world, have been and will be highlighted by each of us nationally.

7. We restate our support for the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East, which, inter alia, advocates a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. We welcome efforts to support the principles and objectives of the Middle East peace process, which contribute toward this end. We note that significant security challenges remain in the region.

8. We reaffirm our determination to abide by our respective moratoria on nuclear test explosions. We recognise that one element in the effective implementation of Article VI and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation is a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. We urge all members of the Conference on Disarmament to show the necessary flexibility to get the Conference back to work.

9. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all States Party to the NPT under Article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the relevant principles on safeguards. We note that a growing number of States Party is showing interest in developing nuclear programmes aimed at addressing their long-term energy requirements and other peaceful purposes. We are ready to cooperate with States Party in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and we emphasise the requirement for compliance with non-proliferation obligations and for development of research, use and production of nuclear energy to be solely for peaceful purposes. We believe such international co-operation should contribute to the full implementation of the NPT and enhance the authority and effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime.

10. We welcome the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and encourage efforts towards a multilateral mechanism to assure

access for all countries to nuclear fuel services as a viable alternative to the indigenous development of enrichment and reprocessing. We note the various proposals that have been put forward. Such an approach would support implementation of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure fashion, preserve the existing competitive open market, respond to the real needs of recipient countries and simultaneously strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We hope States Party will contribute to discussion and development of this agenda in an open-minded and constructive manner. We stress the necessity for the 2010 Review Conference to address this issue.

11. We support, and will work to uphold and strengthen, the framework for the safe and secure uses of nuclear and radioactive materials for peaceful purposes. We reaffirm our commitment to safe and secure regulatory infrastructures, and our determination to develop innovative nuclear energy systems via our respective joint and national initiatives, which will underpin clean and affordable nuclear development, increase energy security, minimise the impact on the environment and the production of radioactive waste, and provide greater protection against proliferation through the provision of reliable fuel services, proliferation-resistant reactor technologies and strengthened international safeguards.

Start worrying and learn to ditch the bomb

[Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson, *The Times*, 30 June 2008]

It won't be easy, but a world free of nuclear weapons is possible

During the Cold War nuclear weapons had the perverse effect of making the world a relatively stable place. That is no longer the case. Instead, the world is at the brink of a new and dangerous phase - one that combines widespread proliferation with extremism and geopolitical tension.

Some of the terrorist organisations of today would have little hesitation in using weapons of mass destruction to further their own nihilistic agendas. Al-Qaeda and groups linked to it may be trying to obtain nuclear material to cause carnage on an unimaginable scale. Rogue or unstable states may assist, either willingly or unwillingly; the more nuclear material in circulation, the greater the risk that it falls into the wrong hands. And while governments, no matter how distasteful, are usually capable of being deterred, groups such as al-Qaeda, are not. Cold War calculations have been replaced by asymmetrical warfare and suicide missions.

There is a powerful case for a dramatic reduction in the stockpile of nuclear weapons. A new historic initiative is needed but it will only succeed by working collectively and through multilateral institutions. Over the past year an influential project has developed in the United States, led by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn, all leading policymakers. They have published two articles in *The Wall Street Journal* describing a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and articulating some of the steps that, cumulatively taken, could help to achieve that end. Senator John McCain has endorsed that analysis recently. Barack Obama is likely to be as sympathetic.

A comparable debate is now needed in this country and across Europe. Britain and France, both nuclear powers, are well placed to join in renewed multilateral efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in existence. The American initiative does not call for unilateral disarmament; neither do we. Instead, progress can be made only by working alongside other nations towards a shared goal, using commonly agreed procedures and strategies.

The world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons are overwhelmingly controlled by two nations: the United States and Russia. While Washington is in possession of about 5,000 deployed warheads, Russia is reported to have well over 6,000, making its stockpile the largest in the world. It is difficult to understand why either the American or Russian governments feel that they need such enormous numbers of nuclear weapons.

Hard-headed Americans, such as Dr Kissinger and Mr Shultz, have argued that dramatic reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in these arsenals could be made without risking

America's security. It is indisputable that if serious progress is to be made it must begin with these two countries.

The US and Russia should ensure that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 continues to provide the basis for co-operation in reducing the number of nuclear weapons. The treaty's provisions need to be extended. Agreement should be reached on the issue of missile defence. The US proposal to make Poland and the Czech Republic part of their missile defence shield has upset the Kremlin. It has been a divisive issue, but it need not be. Any missile threat to Europe or the United States would also be a threat to Russia. Furthermore, Russia and the West share a strong common interest in preventing proliferation.

Elsewhere, there are numerous stockpiles that lie unaccounted for. In the former Soviet Union alone, some claim that there is enough uranium and plutonium to make a further 40,000 weapons. There have been reports of nuclear smuggling in the Caucasus and some parts of Eastern Europe. Security Council Resolution 1540, which obliges nations to improve the security of stockpiles, allows for the formation of teams of specialists to be deployed in those countries that do not possess the necessary infrastructure or experience in dealing with stockpiles. These specialists should be deployed to assist both in the monitoring and accounting for of nuclear material and in the setting up of domestic controls to prevent security breaches. Transparency in these matters is vital and Britain can, and should, play a role in providing experts who can fulfil this important role.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, for 40 years the foundation of counter-proliferation efforts, in need of an overhaul. The provisions on monitoring compliance need to be strengthened. The monitoring provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which require a state to provide access to any location where nuclear material may be present, should be accepted by all the nations that have signed up to the NPT. These requirements, if implemented, would have the effect of strengthening the ability of the IAEA to provide assurances about both declared nuclear material and undeclared activities. At a time when a number of countries, including Iran and Syria, may be developing a nuclear weapons programme under the guise of civilian purposes, the ability to be clear about all aspects of any programme is crucial.

Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into effect would, similarly, represent strong progress in the battle to reduce the nuclear threat. The treaty would ban the testing of nuclear weapons, ensuring that the development of new generations of weapons ceases. However, it will only come into force once the remaining nine states who have not yet ratified it do so. Britain, working through Nato and the EU, must continue to encourage those remaining states that have not yet agreed to the Treaty - India, Pakistan, Egypt, China, Indonesia, North Korea, Israel, Iran and the United States - to ratify it.

A modern non-proliferation regime will require mechanisms to provide those nations wishing to develop a civilian nuclear capability with the assistance and co-operation of those states that possess advanced expertise and that are able to provide nuclear fuel, spent-fuel management assistance, enriched uranium and technical assistance. But, in return, proper verification procedures must be in place and access for the IAEA must not be impeded.

Achieving real progress in reducing the nuclear weapons threat will impose obligations on all nuclear powers not just the US and Russia. The UK has reduced its nuclear weapons capability significantly over the past 20 years. It disposed of its freefall and tactical nuclear weapons and has achieved a big reduction of the number of warheads used by the Trident system to the minimum believed to be compatible with the retention of a nuclear deterrent. If we are able to enter into a period of significant multilateral disarmament Britain, along with France and other existing nuclear powers, will need to consider what further contribution it might be able to make to help to achieve the common objective.

Substantial progress towards a dramatic reduction in the world's nuclear weapons is possible. The ultimate aspiration should be to have a world free of nuclear weapons. It will take time, but with political will and improvements in monitoring, the goal is achievable. We must act before it is too late, and we can begin by supporting the campaign in America for a non-nuclear weapons world.

Joint U.S.-Russian Statement: One Year of Progress Following the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation

[3 July 2008]

As President Bush and former Russian President Putin jointly declared on July 3, 2007, "we share a common vision of growth in the use of nuclear energy, including in developing countries, to increase the supply of electricity, promote economic growth and development, and reduce reliance on fossil fuels, resulting in decreased pollution and greenhouse gases."

The July 3, 2007 Joint Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation proposed to initiate a new format for enhancing civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to extend the benefits of nuclear power while promoting the highest standards of safety, security and nonproliferation.

The Declaration presented a number of ways – including the development of human resources and other infrastructure, the facilitation of nuclear plant financing, and the management of spent fuel – through which the U.S. and Russia are prepared to cooperate, together with others, in making the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to a wide range of interested states, and developing countries in particular. The U.S. and Russia are currently developing new ways of providing assistance to states considering nuclear energy or considering expansion of existing nuclear energy programs. The entry into force of a formal U.S.-Russian civil nuclear cooperation agreement will improve in particular our ability to operate together in furtherance of the Joint Declaration's objectives.

By promoting best practices of nuclear safety and security, and by offering states a viable alternative to the development of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, the United States and Russia believe that this approach will allow greater access to peaceful nuclear energy, while at the same time strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, and Russian Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov are working in tandem, and in partnership with others, to advance the objectives of the Joint Declaration.

Our countries are determined to reach out to developing states in need of clean and reliable energy supplies with the promise of enhanced cooperation. Within this context, a number of States have made public statements of intent to rely on the international fuel market in lieu of developing indigenous enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Our countries are also promoting full implementation of NPT safeguards obligations, and adoption of international conventions on safety, security and liability.

On this occasion, the United States and the Russian Federation reaffirm our commitment to the responsible expansion of nuclear energy, and reiterate that this expansion must proceed in a manner that maximizes nuclear safety and security and minimizes proliferation risk.

Letter from M. Nicola Sarkozy, President of the Republic to Mr Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General

[5 December 2008]

The United Nations has an important role to play in the debate on disarmament. Europe wishes to play a fully-fledged role in that discussion. That is why I wanted to draw your attention to the proposals that the European Union has just presented this year at the United Nations.

On 23 September, I told the United Nations General Assembly that Europe wants to promote peace. This is true with respect to the fight against terrorism, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and crisis management.

It is also true with respect to disarmament, and notably nuclear disarmament. Europe, two of whose members have nuclear weapons, is particularly concerned. Europe has already done much for disarmament. Keenly aware of the fact that its own

security encourages the pursuit of global disarmament efforts, Europe is prepared to do more. Our ambition extends to every aspect of disarmament, for we are convinced of the need to strive for general disarmament. In this area as in others, Europe wants to act in accordance with a comprehensive political and strategic vision.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010 represents a landmark date for the international non-proliferation regime. We must seize this opportunity to move towards a more secure world, one in which it is possible to meet all the objectives established by the NPT, whether they be non-proliferation, disarmament, or access to nuclear energy for peaceful uses. As for disarmament, Europe wished to propose a clear direction as of this year by presenting the United Nations General Assembly with concrete and realistic disarmament initiatives:

- the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the completion of its verification regime, and the dismantling as soon as possible of all nuclear testing facilities in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;
- the opening without delay and without preconditions of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the introduction of an immediate moratorium on the production of such material;
- the establishment of confidence and transparency measures by the nuclear powers;
- further progress in the current discussions between the United States and Russia on the development of a legally-binding post-START arrangement, and an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, in particular by the States which possess the largest arsenals;
- the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those States which have them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination;
- the start of consultations on a treaty banning short and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles;
- the adherence to and implementation by all of the Hague Code of Conduct;
- mobilization in all other areas of disarmament.

Moving forward on the path of disarmament implies that the will to progress is shared unanimously. Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, like confidence, transparency and reciprocity, are key elements of collective security.

I hope that the international community will join the European Union in supporting and carrying out this plan of action; it is an ambitious programme that is truly capable of achieving concrete progress on the path of disarmament.

Europe is counting on your support. I hope you will convey to the international community, particularly within the United Nations, this initiative in support of a more secure world.

EU Statement

[Conference on Disarmament, 1st Part Geneva,
20 January 2009]

Mr President,

[Eds...]

6. I would like to recall that the European Union has proposed a clear direction by presenting the United Nations General Assembly at its current session with concrete and realistic disarmament initiatives:

- the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the completion of its verification regime, and the dismantling as soon as possible of all nuclear testing facilities in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;
- the opening without delay and without preconditions of negotiations for a Treaty banning the production of fissile

material for nuclear weapons, and the introduction of an immediate moratorium on the production of such material;

- the establishment of transparency and confidence-building measures by the nuclear powers;
- further progress in the current discussions between the United States and Russia on the development of a legally-binding postSTART arrangement, and an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the NPT, in particular by the states which possess the largest arsenals;
- the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, by those states which have them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination;
- the start of consultations on a Treaty banning short and intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles;
- the adherence to and implementation by all of the Hague Code of Conduct;
- mobilisation in all other areas of disarmament.

7. Several of these initiatives are relevant to the Conference on Disarmament. The European Union attaches a clear priority to the negotiation, without preconditions, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), as a means to strengthen disarmament and nonproliferation. It constitutes a priority ripe for negotiation. The European Union is also ready to engage in substantial discussion on the other items included in CD/1840: on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, dealing with issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and dealing with appropriate international arrangements to assure nonnuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as on other issues related to the Conference on Disarmament agenda.

[Eds...]

Thank you Mr President

U.S EU Statement on "Nuclear Disarmament".

[Conference on Disarmament, 1st Part, Geneva,
12 February 2009]

[Eds – Footnotes not included]

Mr President,

[Eds...]

2. Today I will, on behalf of the European Union, address the issue of Nuclear Disarmament.

3. At the outset let me underline that the European Union attaches a clear priority to the negotiations at the CD of an FMCT. An effective FMCT would constitute a significant step in the process of nuclear disarmament, as well as strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. The EU will address the issue of an FMCT in a separate statement at a later date.

4. One of the key elements in the current proposal for a Programme of Work for the Conference on Disarmament, CD/1840, is that the CD should engage in "substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war". The EU is ready to engage further on these issues as soon as a Programme of Work has been

5. In the meantime, the European Union and its Member States will continue to constructively participate in the informal debates on the issues led by Coordinators, including on nuclear disarmament.

6. The last time the European Union made a formal statement at this Conference specifically dedicated to the issue of nuclear disarmament was on 6 February 2007. The EU stands by this statement.

7. Since then, the EU has continued to stress that global security, as well as European security, would benefit from continued global disarmament efforts. The European Union intends to play a full-fledged role in this.

8. In that regard, we call on the international community to work to promote the concrete and realistic disarmament initiatives which the EU submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its

current session. All these initiatives which were endorsed by our 27 Heads of State and Government in December last year in the *Statement on Strengthening International Security*, which was submitted as an official document of the CD, were outlined in our statement in the CD plenary on 20 January 2009. Several of those initiatives are relevant *inter alia* to the Conference on Disarmament and its work on the specific issue of nuclear disarmament.

9. Besides the negotiation of an FMCT, which the EU will address in a separate statement, the European Union calls for the universal ratification of the CTBT, a treaty that was the latest, and hopefully not the last, concrete result from this negotiating body. In addition, the EU also calls for the completion of its verification regime and the dismantling of all nuclear test facilities in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community. The European Union is encouraged by recent signs of political momentum towards the entry into force of the CTBT. Statements made by the new US administration give rise to some optimism for progress towards this goal. We therefore repeat our urgent call to all states which have not yet ratified this crucial disarmament treaty, and in particular the nine remaining Annex II states, to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay:

10. The European Union calls for further progress in the current discussions between the United States and Russia on the development of a legally binding post-START arrangement, and an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, in particular by the states which possess the largest arsenals. We take note of some encouraging signals in this regard: with statements made by the new US Administration.

11. The European Union also calls for the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons by those states which possess them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to the reduction and elimination of these weapons.

12. The European Union also favours the establishment of transparency and confidence-building measures by the nuclear powers. The EU welcomes the increased transparency shown by some nuclear-weapon states on the nuclear weapons that they possess and calls on other concerned states to do likewise.

13. The European Union proposes the start of consultations on a treaty banning short and intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles.

14. In these areas related to the issue of nuclear disarmament, the European Union is convinced that concrete progress is realistic. We note that these areas were also mentioned in the report of the Coordinator on Nuclear Disarmament during last year's CD session.

15. The European Union will continue its efforts on the issue of nuclear disarmament also in the context of the NPT review process. The NPT, based on its three mutually reinforcing pillars, represents a unique and irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security, and stability. The authority and integrity of the NPT must be preserved and strengthened, and to that end the EU will continue to promote all the objectives contained in the Treaty. The upcoming third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, in May this year, will be an important occasion to continue to lay the groundwork for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. The EU intends to work actively towards this end.

Thank you, Mr President.

U.S. Statement on the Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2008

[Gregory L Schulte, Permanent U.S. Representative to the IAEA, at IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, 2-6 March 2009]

Madam Chairwoman,

This is the first meeting of the IAEA Board since the inauguration of President Obama. This is a moment of complex challenge for the IAEA, but also a moment of unparalleled opportunity with a renewed American commitment to the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy. My delegation notes with appreciation the positive interest of Member States in the U.S. Presidential election

and in the ongoing adjustment and review of U.S. policies, including many that affect the work of the Agency. I hope, Madam Chairwoman, you will permit me to start my intervention with five points on behalf of the new U.S. Administration.

First, President Obama and his new Administration strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency in all aspects of its mission. We seek to strengthen the IAEA and to ensure that the Agency gets the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job. Our top priority is the verification role of the Agency, which is essential to creating the confidence that enables countries worldwide to benefit from peaceful use of nuclear technology. This essential verification role will grow as more and more countries invest in nuclear power to provide clean energy for growth and development. Instruments like the Additional Protocol will become increasingly important not just for verification but to build confidence among nations.

Second, we support the important role the IAEA plays in global efforts to help countries adopt the highest standards for nuclear security and protection of nuclear materials. President Obama has identified preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear and radiological weapons as his number one security priority. The National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy is already pursuing a major Global Threat Reduction Initiative to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. We will continue to look to the IAEA for support in global efforts to secure nuclear materials; to phase out the use of highly enriched uranium in the civil nuclear sector; to strengthen international intelligence and police cooperation to prevent WMD terrorism; and to help build the capacity of governments around the world to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear materials.

Third, President Obama has expressed strong support for the creation of an IAEA-administered nuclear fuel bank. While in the U.S. Senate, both he and Secretary Clinton supported legislation providing \$50 million to the IAEA in response to the challenge grant from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The Administration wants to work with the IAEA and Member States to put into place a fuel bank that would allow countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation. We welcome the initiatives by the Russian Federation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, as well as by many others.

Fourth, we believe that preserving the Agency's credibility in implementing NPT safeguards depends on our success in dealing with the immediate challenges – specifically those posed by North Korea, Iran, and Syria. The new Administration intends to strengthen diplomatic efforts to address each of these challenges. One principle will remain constant and is shared by us all: The need for countries to abide by their international obligations, including cooperation with the IAEA. We must strengthen and revalidate this important Agency rather than allowing those who violate their obligations to discredit it.

Fifth, the new Administration recognizes that the IAEA's essential role in nonproliferation is part of a broader international effort that includes diplomacy and disarmament. While the IAEA must pursue its essential verification role, there is also a role for diplomacy in ensuring the viability of the NPT. Hence, the Administration's readiness for direct engagement with Tehran as part of the international effort to convince Iran's leadership to meet its responsibilities. Hence, the Administration using dialogue with Syria to encourage its leaders to cooperate with the IAEA. Hence, the Administration's commitment to the Six-Party process to pursue the denuclearization of the North Korea.

The new Administration also recognizes that NPT obligations encompass disarmament as well as nonproliferation. President Obama supports the goal of working toward a world without nuclear weapons. His Administration intends to renew America's commitment to disarmament, including dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material and a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material.

President Obama believes that the best way to reduce global threats and seize global opportunities is to design and implement global solutions. The new administration looks forward to a close working relationship with the IAEA, its Secretariat, and its Member

States to advance our common objective of promoting the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technology.

(Statement continues...)

Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference Following Talks with US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton

[6 March 2009]

Esteemed colleagues,

[Eds...]

As Secretary Clinton said, we very thoroughly examined practically all of the issues on our agenda, starting with bilateral relations and, of course, including our cooperation in the international arena. And all this was done, first of all, in the context of the preparations for the first encounter between the Russian and US Presidents, which is planned to take place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in London at the very beginning of April. We exchanged views regarding our visions of the near-term priorities in our relations.

I am convinced that the Secretary of State will share my opinion that these priorities coincide for the most part. Of course, each side highlighted its emphases and nuances and it would be an exaggeration to say that we agreed on everything, but we agreed that on all questions, including those on which we have differences, we will work in the spirit of partnership, honestly and openly. What matters most is that we found just this readiness in work. We have a common understanding that today our bilateral relations are acquiring an additional chance which cannot be lost. Herein lie the interests of our peoples, the interests of the United States, the interests of the Russian Federation and we are fully aware of the responsibility of our two countries for the state of affairs in the world.

As I've said, we devoted much attention to the preparation of the meeting between our presidents in London. We substantively discussed so called sore points in our relations and looked at how work could be organized to clear the logjams left over from previous years and how to make certain a constructive component, goal-oriented partner-like collaboration, dominates our relations.

We paid special attention to the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in general, of strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. I am certain that it is within our power to reach a common denominator and maybe even come out with a plus for our strategic relationship on both START and missile defense. I note the readiness of our US partners for dialogue on the basis of mutual consideration of interests.

We looked at the situation with nuclear weapons nonproliferation, including as it applies to Iran and to the issue of the Korean peninsula. I am certain that in the near future we will try to come to some kind of agreement, some results that would enable us to bring a political-diplomatic resolution of these issues closer, within the framework of the existing negotiation formats.

We noted the special significance of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and agreed to cooperate in the framework of the process of the preparations for the next review conference to be held in 2010. We also recalled that some time ago at the initiative of Russia and the United States the UN Security Council had adopted an important resolution aimed at preventing nuclear weapons or materials that can be used for their production from falling into non-state actor hands. And we agreed that our joint initiative would remain a subject of our special attention and that we might propose additional steps to reinforce the regime created by the Security Council in this area. We have many common initiatives which remain valid on the fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism. And here too there are concrete accords on how jointly to seek greater consolidation of the international community.

[Eds...]

Question: Do you think it's possible to reach new SOA accords before December 5, 2009?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I fully subscribe to this statement. We will do everything to ensure that the accord is reached. The present Treaty is outdated; at least, the limits there have long since been fulfilled, and to stay within this Treaty would mean that both Russia and the United States can, essentially, increase, not reduce their strategic offensive arms. This will be a very bad signal to all others, especially ahead of the next Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

[Eds...]

Statement by H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Plenary Meeting of The Conference on Disarmament

[Geneva, 7 March 2009]

Dear Mr. President,

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

Dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

It was slightly over a year ago that I last spoke at this forum. Since that time, much efforts have been taken to improve the international situation. However, we did not manage to achieve any drastic positive change. Moreover, we have witnessed further increase of global conflict potential, which distracts us from the solution of urgent problems related to the need to enhance international stability and to establish an environment conducive to consistent steps in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Today, we have to acknowledge our inability to overcome a stalemate in the field of multilateral disarmament. A stalemate situation in the Conference's activities that has continued for over ten years clearly reflects an unfavorable state of affairs in the field of international security. Efforts taken by groups of "like-minded" states are capable of partially solving disarmament problems; however, in a long-term perspective, such efforts will face serious restraints, which, in fact, could result in an erosion of the existing mechanisms, including this Conference. Of course, additional problems emerge due to the current global financial and economic crisis, which constrict the resource base for disarmament and conversion programs.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that under globalization the crisis cannot be overcome through military preparations or war as happened in 1930-s. Regretfully, the Cold War has "institutionalized" militarization in the field of international relations. We need to get rid of this holdover.

Russia is aware of its special responsibility as a nuclear state and permanent member of the UN Security Council for nuclear disarmament and strengthening of the WMD non-proliferation regime. My country has fully met its obligations under the START I. Implementation of the Moscow Treaty (SORT) is well underway. It's now time to take new steps in this area aimed at making our world more secure.

We welcome the statements made by the new US Administration in favor of multilateral approaches to the maintenance of international security and disarmament. We are prepared, as was suggested by our American partners, to "reset" our relations. Conclusion of a new legally binding Russian-American treaty on strategic offensive arms could become a priority step in that direction.

Let me now read out the statement by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, on this issue.

"On December 5 this year, the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START 1) expires. The importance of this instrument for ensuring international peace and stability can hardly be overestimated. It played a historic role in ensuring strategic stability and security as well as reducing strategic offensive arms arsenals. Its implementation has made the world safer.

Today, we are facing a pressing need to move further along the road of nuclear disarmament. In accordance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Russia is fully committed to reaching the goal of a world free from these most deadly weapon.

As far back as in 2005 we invited the United States to conclude a new agreement to succeed START 1. It could be based on all the best elements of the Treaty which has been effectively operating, while reflecting present-day strategic realities.

In arriving at that decision, we have taken into consideration, among other things, the fact that the limits established by START 1 were met as far back as in 2001. At present, the numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and their warheads are considerably lower. Thus, START 1 is far from limiting Russia and the United States in the missile and nuclear sphere it, in fact, permits to increase the arsenals of strategic offensive arms.

Our approach to such an agreement is as follows. A future agreement should be legally binding. It is of no less importance that the instrument should be forward-looking and should limit not only warheads, but also strategic delivery vehicles, i.e. intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

We also deem it necessary to exclude possible deployment of strategic offensive arms outside national territories.

I wish to emphasize that Russia is open to dialogue and is prepared for negotiations with the new US Administration. I fully share the commitment of the US President Barack H. Obama to the noble goal of saving the world from the nuclear threat and see here a fertile ground for a joint work.

I believe that constructive interaction in this field will contribute to general improvement of the Russian-US relations.

Dmitry A. Medvedev.”

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today we witness a growing number of international initiatives on nuclear disarmament such as Hoover Initiative, Global Zero Initiative, Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, Luxemburg Forum, as well as the plan put forward by Mr. Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of Great Britain. Russia appreciates the focus of these initiatives on solving global security issues on a multilateral basis and is willing to positively contribute to their consideration.

However, progress towards “global zero” can only be achieved through strengthened strategic stability and strict adherence to the principle of equal security for all. In its turn this suggests the need to carry out a set of measures required for a sustainable and consistent disarmament process. Among those measures are:

- further advancement of nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States, with their “gradual” engagement in efforts already being undertaken by Russia and U.S.;
- to prevent weaponization of outer space;
- to prevent operational deployment of strategic offensive weapons equipped with conventional warheads, i.e. the building of the so-called “compensatory” potential;
- to ensure that States do not possess a “nuclear upload potential”;
- to prevent attempts aimed at using NPT membership to implement military nuclear programs;
- to ensure verifiable cessation of conventional capabilities’ development coupled with efforts to resolve other international issues, including settlement of regional conflicts.

I would like to draw particular attention to the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. Real progress in nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved in a situation when unilateral efforts to develop strategic ABM systems undermine this relationship. This is fraught with erosion of strategic stability and disbalancing of the system of checks and balances that ensures global parity.

Acting in the spirit of strategic openness, we propose a constructive alternative to unilateral plans in this crucial area, i.e. to unite efforts of all States interested in counteracting potential missile threats. Our package proposal with regard to developing cooperation remains on the negotiation table. We will develop and elaborate it. We are ready for a joint work based on equitable partnership.

Ensuring an effective and sustainable implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is of pivotal importance for global security, and enhancement of its universality remains a priority. We deem it necessary to prepare for the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 2010 agreed recommendations that would provide continued efficiency of the Treaty as a crucially important instrument to prevent nuclear proliferation. We need to achieve unconditional fulfillment by its Parties of their obligations embodied in the indivisibility of three fundamental pillars - non-proliferation, peaceful uses of atomic energy and disarmament. The Third session of the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference provides a great opportunity to reach an agreement on possible ways to intensify negotiations in all those areas.

Strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms limitation regime is inextricably linked to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). Russia ratified the Treaty in 2000. We have consistently advocated its early entry into force. The moratorium on nuclear tests, with all its importance, cannot serve as a substitute for legal obligations. Therefore we call upon all States whose accession is necessary for the Treaty’s entry into force, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. We have noted, naturally, some positive signals from Washington regarding possible changes in the US position on CTBT and expect that those signals are embodied in specific decisions of President Obama’s Administration.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute to strengthening nuclear nonproliferation regime, achieving peace and security regionally and globally. We welcome the completion of the ratification process by all Parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, which resulted in its entry into force.

The task to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the Middle East remains urgent. We consistently advocate this region to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, eventually, a zone free from all other types of weapons of mass destruction. In 1995 and 2000, the NPT Parties already took decisions on the Middle East. Mutually acceptable solutions for their implementation need to be sought within the forthcoming preparatory activities for the NPT Review Conference. We stand ready for a joint work to fulfill that task as well.

IAEA verification activities need to be made more effective. The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, ratified by Russia in 2007, is an efficient tool of enhancing IAEA capacities in this field. We call on all countries to become parties to it. Eventually, the Additional Protocol is to become a universally accepted standard to verify the compliance of States with their NPT non-proliferation obligations and a new major standard in the field of nuclear exports.

Growing interest in peaceful nuclear energy is a trend of current economic development. Energy security and climate are necessarily linked to peaceful nuclear applications, which should be used more widely in full accordance with the NPT States parties’ inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This opens up new opportunities for international cooperation, primarily to ensure stable and secure supplies of nuclear fuel for countries developing their nuclear energy sector, subject to due compliance with the requirements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We note the increasing importance of multilateral approaches that could serve as an economically sound and feasible alternative to the development of all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle nationally.

In recent years we have witnessed quite a few interesting initiatives in this field as well. Russia suggested that joint work should be carried out to develop global nuclear energy infrastructure through the establishment of multilateral centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services. The International Uranium Enrichment Center has been already established in partnership with Kazakhstan at the Angarsk enrichment plant. We welcome the decision of Armenia and Ukraine to join this Center, as well as the interest in joining it shown by some other countries. The Angarsk Center plans to create a buffer stock of low-enriched uranium under the IAEA supervision to ensure guaranteed supplies of fuel in case of a market failure.

Our ability to adequately and timely respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism is a prerequisite for ensuring security of every State and

of the entire world community. The Russian-American Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism put forward in 2006 is a major contribution to this cause. It is already being implemented and is growing in scale. 75 States have joined it to date. We are convinced that it will enjoy even broader support in the future. This is a good example of a possible cooperation modality in the modern world to find responses to new challenges and threats.

We support revitalization of multilateral diplomacy, primarily within the UN and the Conference on Disarmament. We note a considerable contribution of the Conference to the strengthening of international security. We express our gratitude to all delegations and to Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference, for their efforts to enhance relevance of this forum, including their persistent efforts to build consensus with regard to its programme of work.

Preventing weaponization of outer space is of particular importance among disarmament issues. When Russia and China introduced a draft international Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) at this Conference last February, they felt that it was easier to prevent weaponization of outer space than to get rid of new stockpiles of weapons afterwards. Prevention of an arms race in outer space will also contribute to making the strategic situation predictable and preserving integrity of orbital assets. This should serve the interests of all States using outer space for peaceful purposes.

Russia and China will soon introduce a document summing up the outcome of the Conference debate and outlining our response to the comments received regarding the draft PPWT. We hope that it will serve as useful input to future negotiations.

A year ago at this forum Russia also introduced draft basic elements of an international legal agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range (ground-launched) missiles. We reiterate our call for a detailed discussion of this initiative that has gained a great deal of support. Our idea is echoed by the EU-backed proposals of French President Nicolas Sarkozy to start negotiations on banning intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-to-ground missiles. We are prepared for a constructive dialogue with both the EU and all other partners on possible ways of dealing with these issues with a view to establishing a universal regime for banning these types of missiles.

We are also prepared to start negotiation on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes (FMCT), which would become an important milestone in the processes of nuclear disarmament and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In conclusion, I would like to state the following. In our view, the efforts made to harmonize the priority items on the Conference agenda in order to resume its substantive work are inextricably linked with general search for ways to overcome the present-day crisis phenomena: be it in financial and economic, military and political, environmental or other areas. We can only solve the problems we are facing now through joint action, by restoring trust in global politics and making collective efforts meeting the interests of all States and the world community as a whole.

Russia is open to a constructive dialogue and stands ready to work jointly with its partners. The right moment has come today, for the first time after the end of the Cold War, for making real progress in resuming the global disarmament process on a broad agenda. I am convinced that we should not miss this opportunity.

Nuclear energy and proliferation

[Speech by the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,
17 March 2009]

[Eds...]

Now in 2005 the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference failed. We cannot afford to fail next year. So as we approach the 2010 Review Conference I want us to renew and refresh for our times the grand global bargain, the covenant of hope between nations at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a bargain under which we reaffirm the rights and responsibilities for those countries which forego nuclear weapons. But it is also a bargain under which there are tough responsibilities to be discharged by

nuclear weapon states, for as successor states we cannot expect to successfully exercise moral and political leadership in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons if we ourselves do not demonstrate leadership on the question of disarmament of our weapons.

Under this bargain there is a right for all states to develop civil nuclear power, but there is a responsibility for these states to reject the deployment of nuclear weapons and their development. There is a responsibility too on nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear weapons. So in the coming months Britain will, working with other countries, set out a Road to 2010 Plan with detailed proposals on civil nuclear power, on disarmament and non-proliferation, on fissile material security and a role in the development of the International Atomic Energy Authority. We will be seeking the widest possible international engagement and consultation around this plan. We will also host a Recognised Nuclear Weapon State Conference on nuclear disarmament issues and on confidence building measures, including the verification of disarmament.

For in the same way as we have tried to lead in challenging old orthodoxies by eliminating conventional weapons which caused harm to civilians, such as cluster munitions, I want to pledge that Britain will be at the forefront of the international campaign to prevent nuclear proliferation and to accelerate multilateral nuclear disarmament.

Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically states that countries that do possess nuclear weapons agree to divest themselves over time. No single nuclear weapon state can be expected to disarm unilaterally, but I know that people have been trying to abolish nuclear weapons almost since their invention in the 1940s. Even in the Cold War when they were central to countries' defence planning, there were efforts to reduce their spread and indeed to initiate disarmament and then the introduction of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In the 1980s Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan, leaders of the countries with by far the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapon. Every President of both parties in the United States since the 1960s has reaffirmed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If no single nuclear weapon state can be expected to disarm unilaterally, neither should it, but step by step we have to transform the discussion of nuclear disarmament from one of platitudes to one of hard commitment. We have also to help create a new international system to ensure non-nuclear states acquire the new sources of energy that they want to have. Because whether we like it or not, we will not meet the challenges of climate change without the far wider use of civil nuclear power.

[Eds...]

So this morning I want to outline the principles that must guide our progress in the months ahead, and the practical steps I believe we should consider to strengthen the global non-proliferation architecture by renewing and refreshing the global nuclear bargain for our times.

And let me be clear, we are not asking non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from proliferation while nuclear weapon states amass new weapons; we are asking them not to proliferate while nuclear weapon states take the steps to reduce their own arsenals in line with the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirements.

I believe it is a fair and even-handed bargain that contains two central elements: that we enshrine the right for all nations to acquire civil nuclear power safely, securely and subject to proper multilateral verification, processes with tougher sanctions brought to bear on those who break the rules; and that nuclear weapon states must set out much more clearly the responsibilities that we too must discharge.

So what does that mean in practice? In the first place we must give every nation the right of access, what President Eisenhower once memorably called atoms for peace. But in doing so we must as an international community be completely confident that we are able to ensure there are appropriate mechanisms for multilateral control of the entire fuel cycle, ensuring the security of fissile material, preventing unwanted proliferation with clear, tough and immediate sanctions for those who break the rules.

Iran is a test case for this new philosophy of the right to civil nuclear power with sanction rule-breakers. And let me be unequivocal. Iran has the same absolute right to a peaceful nuclear programme - civil nuclear programme - as any other country. Indeed the UK and the international community stand ready to help Iran achieve it, as the opening of the nuclear plant at Bushehr already shows. But let me be equally clear that Iran's current nuclear programme is unacceptable. Iran has concealed its nuclear activities, refused to cooperate with the IAEA, flouted UN Security Council resolutions and its refusal to play by the rules leads us to view its nuclear programme as a critical proliferation threat.

Iran therefore faces a clear choice: to continue in this way and face further and tougher sanctions; or change to a UN-overseen civil nuclear energy programme that will bring the greatest benefits to its citizens. I hope that Iran will make the right choice and take advantage of the international community's willingness to negotiate, including President Obama's offer of engagement, rather than face further sanctions and regional instability. So I urge Iran, once again, to work with us rather than against us upon this. The opportunity to do so remains on the table and the choice is Iran's to make.

For our own part in Britain we will bring forward detailed plans for the responsible future management of our stocks of fissile material, and as part of the road to the 2010 consultation we will examine how best to deal with those stocks which have accumulated. I am committed that the UK will also lead on bringing forward proposals internationally for multilateral control of the fuel cycle. We will seek an innovative partnership between industry, academia and government for further research and development to tackle the technical challenges that you know are involved in developing a proliferation-proof nuclear fuel cycle.

There are a number of proposals, as you know, that are already being considered. The UK's proposal for a nuclear fuel assurance, or uranium enrichment bond, is an important contribution to resolving this important matter. However, most of the options proposed are aimed at the front half of the fuel cycle - enrichment and fuel provision. I believe we should now go further in considering all the options, including those that can address the challenges of handling spent fuel in a more secure way. As countries already operating civil nuclear programmes know, establishing a civil nuclear programme carries both significant cost and technological challenges.

So I would encourage countries embarking on civil nuclear programmes for the first time to consider all options. This should include detailed examination of whether a collaborative approach, perhaps at a regional level, could provide a new opportunity to make access to civil nuclear power a reality. With the oversight of an international body, countries could join together to share in the development of a civil programme, and this approach could be particularly beneficial in regions such as the Middle East where already the Gulf Cooperation Council has proposed a joint nuclear technology programme for peaceful applications conforming to international regulations.

[Eds...]

Just as we must reshape the international financial architecture, to meet the challenges of a global economy, so too we must reshape the international architecture that deals with proliferation in a global society. I accept that this will require new funds from within the international community for a significantly changed global work programme. The changes will be significant: a central role in the security of fissile material; a clear and proactive mandate to inspect with enhanced powers of inspection to cover not just civil programmes but also eventually military programmes; more support and training for an inspectorate that will cover both the extension of civil nuclear power and the monitoring of any abuses of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and binding guarantees about the safeguards in place.

But if the International Atomic Energy Agency is to play this enlarged and reformed role, its safeguards regime would also need to be further strengthened. This means everyone should implement the highest level of safeguards possible, such as the additional protocol giving the IAEA the power to ensure that there is no indication of activity designed to turn peaceful nuclear energy programmes into nuclear weapons.

Beyond this, we also need to look at the development of next generation safeguards which introduce even greater levels of assurance. Any material failure to cooperate with inspections, and any material breach or withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should automatically lead to reference to the United Nations Security Council, and indeed it should be assumed that sanctions will be imposed in response to anything other than the most minor of breaches.

At the moment the international community has to prove an offence against the treaty, but in future the right to develop nuclear energy should be matched by knowledge obligations towards openness and transparency. And having signed the treaty it should be the country's responsibility to prove it is adhering to the treaty and to dispel and disprove any accusations of its being undermined.

It is vital that we also ensure that terrorists cannot get their hands on nuclear material. This requires revised, stronger, universally implemented international standards for the protection of fissile material. We will bring forward proposals for such standards as part of the plan - the Road to 2010. Every nuclear state and prospective civil nuclear state must give security the highest attention.

[Eds...]

Now to achieve our objectives we need two major breakthroughs: effective and universal mechanisms to prevent proliferation from non-nuclear weapon states; and active steps by nuclear weapon states towards disarmament. [Eds...]

So the other core ambition of the Road to 2010 proposals we will publish this summer is a credible road map towards disarmament by all the nuclear weapon states, through measures that will command the confidence of all the non-nuclear weapon states.

Now of course we have seen already huge cuts in weaponry, an estimated total of 40,000 warheads have been destroyed since the end of the Cold War. But what we need is more than this, we need a forward plan for multilateral disarmament, a joint commitment that is shared and accepted by nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states alike. We must begin by reducing the number of nuclear weapons still out there in the world, and between them the US and Russia retains around 95%. The START Treaty, the mainstay of their bilateral arms control effort, will expire later this year and I welcome their commitment to find and work for a legally binding successor which I hope will pave the way for greater reductions to come.

For our part, as soon as it becomes useful for our arsenal to be included in a broader negotiation, Britain stands ready to participate and to act. The nuclear choices being made today will determine whether we face a future arms race or a future of arms control. Averting the former and promoting transparency in the latter are both vital to our common future.

So the recognised nuclear weapon states must now show unity and leadership and set tirelessly to work on a programme of confidence building measures.

I will gladly share for the benefit of all the pioneering work that we have done in the United Kingdom on the science of verifying warhead destruction. Our atomic weapons establishment, working with partners from Norway, have been developing techniques that can provide reassurance that nuclear weapons have been destroyed, without giving away sensitive information about warhead design.

Now Britain has cut the number of its nuclear warheads by 50% since 1997 and we are committed to retaining the minimum force necessary to maintain effective deterrence. For future submarines our latest assessment is that we can meet this requirement with 12 - not 16 - missile tubes as are on current submarines. In Britain our operationally available warheads now number fewer than 160 and the government keeps this number under constant review. If it is possible to reduce the number of UK warheads further, consistent with our national deterrence and with the progress of multilateral discussions, Britain will be ready to do so.

In the meantime we must drive forward the multilateral agenda, the first steps of which are to commence urgent negotiations without preconditions on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and for all states to

sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. States have national interests but capping the production of weapons usable fissile material and outlawing the testing of nuclear weapons are two powerful and achievable goals that I believe are consistent with the long term needs and interests of every state.

So as we stand together against those who would seek to threaten our security, and in some cases even our existence, I offer today a practical plan to deliver on pledges that have been made.

[Eds...]