Principal researchers in this field are
Jez Littlewood and Ian Kenyon
MCIS recently completed a detailed study of UK biological weapons-related export controls under an ESRC Science in Society award starting in January 2004. The project, entitled 'Science, Security and Regulation: how effective are export controls?' examined UK export controls for equipment, materials, and knowledge of a dual-use nature related to biological weapons.
Science, Security and Regulation: How Effective are Export Controls?
The UK security strategy to counter the threat posed by biological weapons rests on four pillars: (1) Arms control; (2) Preventing supply; (3) Deterring use, and (4) Defending against use. The MCIS project was concerned with one discrete aspect of the UK security strategy: preventing supply. Such efforts are intended to prevent the supply of biological agents and associated dual-use technologies and equipment which could be used in biological weapons programmes.
It is clear that without some kind of regulatory framework further proliferation of biological weapons will become a reality beyond the control of any state or group of states, no matter how powerful. But in an environment where much of the material and equipment has legitimate uses, indeed is essential for the chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, is science to become so controlled and its related industries so heavily regulated that fear of misuse will be detrimental to the scientific and economic benefits the technologies and the industry offer?
Export controls for biological weapons-related equipment have been in place for over a decade, but there is very little information in the public domain about the actual impact of export controls in retarding proliferation. How effective they they been as a policy instrument is thus a significant gap in the knowledge base underpinning government policies.
